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"Amnesty" and Affirmative Misconduct by
the Executive Branch: Does INS v.
Pangilinan Leave Room for
Equitable Remedies Under the
Immigration Reform and Control
Act of 1986?
I. INTRODUCTION
The United States Supreme Court has upheld Congress' plenary
power over immigration and naturalization for over one hundred
years.' During this period, Congress enacted a variety of immigra-
tion-related statutes and delegated significant administrative authority
over immigration matters to certain executive agencies. 2 The present
legislative and regulatory scheme limits immigration through a sys-
tem of quotas3 and individual qualification requirements. 4 These quo-
tas and qualification requirements restrict general immigration to
270,000 immigrants per year. 5 As a result, permanent legal resident
status, and subsequent naturalization, 6 eludes many aliens who desire
to live in the United States.
Some aliens, however, are fortunate. For varying policy reasons,
Congress has historically enacted preferential residency statutes, al-
lowing certain eligible aliens to bypass the standard residency require-
ments in the naturalization process. For instance, in 1942, Congress
1. See Immigration Policy and the Rights ofAliens, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1286, 1312 (1983)
[hereinafter Immigration Policy]. The Supreme Court first articulated Congress' authority to
establish substantive conditions of entry in The Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. 581 (1889).
2. C. GORDON & S. MAILMAN, IMMIGRATION LAW AND PROCEDURE § 1.03 (1988).
3. Id. § 1.03[2][e]. Federal law limits general immigration to 270,000 immigrants per
year. Id. § 1.03[2][e][ii]. Further, no more than 20,000 immigrants may be lawfully admitted
from a single foreign country. Id.
4. Id. § 1.03[2][d]. Individual aliens may be barred for several reasons, including: (1)
improper documentation upon entry; (2) poor health; (3) economic insufficiency; (4) prior
criminal or moral offenses; (5) prohibited political affiliations; (6) draft evasion; (7) illiteracy;
(8) infancy; and (9) physical or mental disability. Id. § 1.03[2][d][ii]-[vii].
5. Id. § 1.03[2][e].
6. Ordinarily, naturalization is only available to those aliens who hold permanent resi-
dent status in the United States for at least five years and exhibit good moral character. Id. §
1.03[9][e].
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passed the Second War Powers Act7 ("1942 Act"), which amended
the Nationality Act of 19408 to make United States citizenship more
readily available to foreign nationals serving in the United States
armed forces during World War II. 9 In another statute, Congress
provided preferential immigration status for certain alien children of
parents who were United States citizens or lawful permanent resi-
dents. '0 Most recently, Congress passed the Immigration Reform and
Control Act of 1986 ("IRCA"),1 ' which creates an amnesty program
whereby undocumented aliens may enjoy permanent resident status
upon satisfaction of certain conditions. 12
II. BACKGROUND OF THE IMMIGRATION REFORM AND CONTROL
ACT OF 1986
A. The Scope of Illegal Immigration Prior to the IRCA
As noted above, hundreds of thousands of aliens legally immi-
grate to the United States every year.' 3 Many more aliens illegally
enter the United States. Exact statistics on the total number of un-
documented immigrants are probably impossible to obtain. However,
the United States Border Patrol typically apprehends over one million
undocumented immigrants each year. 14 In addition to those immi-
grants who enter the United States illegally, many others legally enter
on non-immigrant visas but proceed to live and work in the United
7. Second War Powers Act, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1006 (1942).
8. Nationality Act of 1940, Pub. L. No. 76-853, 54 Stat. 1137 (1940).
9. INS v. Pangilinan, 108 S. Ct. 2210, 2213 (1988). The 1942 Act provided that aliens,
while on active military duty, could bypass various residency, literacy, and education require-
ments prior to naturalization. In passing the 1942 Act, Congress sought to make naturaliza-
tion possible for many veterans who were ineligible under the standard immigration and
naturalization laws. Id.
10. 8 U.S.C. § 101(b) defined a child as "an unmarried person under 21 years of age who
is a legitimate or legitimated child, a stepchild, an adopted child, or an illegitimate child seek-
ing preference by virtue of his relationship with his natural mother." Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S.
787, 789-90 (1977).
11. Immigration Reform & Control Act, Pub. L. No. 99-603, 100 Stat. 3359 (codified in
scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.).
12. See id. § 245A(b), 8 U.S.C. § 1255a(b) (Supp. 1989).
13. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
14. Immigration Control and Legalization Amendments Act of 1986: Report on H.R. 3810
Before the Committee on the Judiciary, H.R. REP. No. 682, 99th Cong., 2d Sess., at 47-48
(1986) [hereinafter Judiciary Committee Report]. The Immigration and Naturalization Service
("INS") projected that the Border Patrol would apprehend approximately 1.8 million undocu-
mented aliens in 1986. In 1985, the Border Patrol apprehended approximately 1.2 million
undocumented aliens. According to the INS, the Border Patrol apprehended over one million
persons between 1976 and 1985. Id.
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States in violation of their visa restrictions.' 5
Most undocumented aliens come from countries plagued by
enormous population growth and few employment opportunities.
1 6
Accordingly, the vast majority of undocumented aliens immigrate to
the United States for one simple reason-to find a job. 17 Many immi-
grants come to the United States believing that the economic opportu-
nities in the United States are better than in their homelands.
In formulating the IRCA, Congress realized that these immi-
grants come to the United States with the highest of motives-to seek
a better life for themselves and their families.' 8 Congress further rec-
ognized that many undocumented immigrants have lived in the
United States for several years and have become integrated parts of
their communities.' 9 Over time, these people have contributed-
among other things-their talent, labor and tax dollars to the United
States.20
B. Congressional Concerns
The steady arrival of large numbers of undocumented immi-
grants in the United States gave rise to several public policy concerns
in Congress. First, Congress feared that the U.S. economy may be
unable to continue absorbing a large influx of unskilled workers. 2'
Second, Congress was worried that the influx of undocumented work-
ers would harm minority groups already living in the United States
who typically compete with undocumented aliens for unskilled em-
ployment. 22 Third, Congress noted the resentment that virtually un-
checked immigration could generate against all immigrants-whether
documented or not.2
3
Along with the above concerns, there was also some general con-
15. Ayuda, Inc. v. Meese, 687 F. Supp. 650, 652 (D.D.C. 1988), rev'd sub nom. Ayuda,
Inc. v. Thornburgh, 880 F.2d 1325 (D.C. Cir. 1989). This group commonly consists of aliens
who work in violation of a student or work-restricted visa and aliens who fail to file requisite
annual or quarterly alien administration reports. Id. at 674.
16. Judiciary Committee Report, supra note 14, at 47.
17. Id. at 46-47.
18. Id. at 46.
19. Id. at 49.
20. Id. The Judiciary Committee report also notes that undocumented immigrants have
contributed to the United States in a "myriad of ways." Id.
21. Id. at 47. The Judiciary Committee report expressly noted that the unemployment
rate stood at approximately seven percent when the IRCA was debated. Id.
22. Id.
23. Although the history of race relations in the United States is well documented and
need not be discussed here, the Judiciary Committee report implies that racial tension would
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cern about the dilution of United States sovereignty. Specifically, the
House Judiciary Committee, expressing concern that the United
States was quickly losing control over its own borders, reiterated the
following comments made by former Attorney General Meese:
"[r]egaining control of our borders is an essential goal of any true
immigration reform. We cannot fairly speak of ourselves as a sover-
eign nation if we cannot responsibly decide who may cross our bor-
ders .... *"24
Finally, Congress expressed concern that the existing situation
harms the undocumented immigrants themselves. 25 It reasoned that,
due to their undocumented status, these immigrants live in constant
fear of persecution and abuse.26 Consequently, undocumented aliens
typically do not seek help when their rights are violated by unscrupu-
lous employers or landlords. 27 In fact, many are even reluctant to
seek the most basic medical attention for themselves and their
families.
28
C. Reforms Provided by the IRCA
Congress passed the IRCA in response to these concerns. 29 Af-
ter extensive congressional debate,30 Congress enacted the IRCA in
an attempt to restore order and integrity to United States immigration
matters. As passed, the IRCA is essentially a compromise between
two competing policy goals. First, Congress passed the IRCA with
compassion for those undocumented aliens already present in the
United States, who have developed strong community ties and who
have made significant contributions to the United States. 3' Congress
recognized that continuing to ignore this hidden underclass would
harm both the undocumented immigrants and the United States. 32
Second, the IRCA reflects the government's desire to prospec-
be heightened between existing minority groups and new immigrants competing for the same
jobs. See id. at 46-48.
24. Id. at 46.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 49.
27. Id. Undocumented aliens are even afraid to seek help if victimized by crime. Id.
Due to this fear, law enforcement is more difficult in areas with high concentrations of illegal
immigrants.
28. Id. at 49.
29. See generally Judiciary Committee Report, supra note 14.
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tively control illegal immigration. 33 With limited resources at its dis-
posal, Congress sought the most efficient and effective method of
controlling illegal immigration. 34 Congress rejected the option of in-
terior enforcement of existing immigration laws and mass deportation
of aliens in violation of these laws. Indeed, Congress determined that
the expulsion of undocumented aliens would waste significant man-
hours and prove very costly.35
Taking a more realistic approach, Congress understood that re-
laxed enforcement of prior immigration laws was the primary reason
that undocumented aliens were able to enter the United States.36
Congress reasoned that, by diverting government resources away
from attempting to deport undocumented aliens already in the United
States, federal officials could concentrate on preventing new flows of
undocumented aliens from entering the United States. 37 In light of
these two competing goals, Congress decided that-for one time
only-the federal government should liberally grant amnesty to un-
documented aliens who meet certain conditions.38 President Reagan
subsequently signed the IRCA into law on November 6, 1986. 39
D. Key Statutory Provisions of the IRCA 's Amnesty Program
The IRCA's major amnesty program is divided into two tiers.4°
Initially, qualified undocumented aliens may apply for temporary res-
33. Id. at 46.
34. Id.
35. Id. The Judiciary Committee expressly noted that "the alternative of intensifying
interior enforcement or attempting mass deportations would be both costly, ineffective, and
inconsistent with our immigrant heritage." Id.
36. Id.
37. Id. See also Catholic Social Services, Inc. v. Meese, No. 86-2907, 1987 WL 61013
(9th Cir. Apr. 3, 1987) (WESTLAW, CTA9 database), vacated, 820 F.2d 289 (9th Cir. 1987).
Although this ruling was subsequently vacated, Circuit Judge Anderson properly summarized
Congress' intent in formulating the IRCA when he said:
the purpose of the IRCA is to control our border to target its enforcement efforts.
To do this, the INS is attempting to concentrate on stemming new flows of undocu-
mented aliens attempting to cross the United States borders rather than ferreting out
aliens in the interior who may have lived within the country for some time.
38. Judiciary Committee Report, supra note 14, at 49. The Judiciary Committee ex-
pressly noted that "a one-time legalization program is a necessary part of an effective enforce-
ment program and . . . a generous program is an essential part of any immigration reform
legislation." Id.
39. Ayuda, Inc. v. Meese, 687 F. Supp. 650, 651 (D.D.C. 1988), rev'd sub nom. Ayuda,
Inc. v. Thornburgh, 880 F.2d 1325 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
40. See Immigration Reform & Control Act § 245A(a)-(b), 8 U.S.C. § 1255a(a)-(b)
(Supp. 1989).
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ident status.41 In order to qualify for this lawful temporary resident
status, alien applicants must satisfy four statutory prerequisites.
First, aliens must timely apply for legal status.42 Second, aliens must
have entered the United States prior to January 1, 1982, and unlaw-
fully resided in the United States continuously since that date.43 This
second IRCA provision adds that either: (1) an alien's non-immigrant
visa-such as a travel or student visa-must have expired before Jan-
uary 1, 1982; or (2) the alien must have violated the terms of his non-
immigrant visa and the alien's unlawful status must have been
"known to the [g]overnment" as of January 1, 1982. 44 Third, the
IRCA's temporary resident provisions require that an alien must have
been physically present in the United States continuously since No-
vember 6, 1986.4 5 Fourth, all aliens must demonstrate that they are
admissible under general immigration requirements. 46
Even after satisfying the above four requirements and obtaining
temporary resident status, an alien's road to citizenship under the
41. Id. § 245A(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1255a(a).
42. Section 245A(a)(1)(A) provides than an "alien must apply for [amnesty] during the
12-month period beginning on a date (not later than 180 days after [November 6, 1986]) desig-
nated by the Attorney General." Id. § 245A(a)(1)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1255a(a)(1)(A). Pursuant to
the IRCA, the Attorney General designated that the 12-month period would begin on May 5,
1987 and end on May 4, 1988. 65 INTERPRETER RELEASES 818 (Aug. 15, 1988).
43. Section 245A(a)(2)(A) provides that an "alien must establish that he entered the
United States before January 1, 1982, and that he has resided continuously in the United States
in an unlawful status since such date and through the date the application is filed under this
subsection." Immigration Reform & Control Act § 245A(a)(2)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1255a(a)(2)(A)
(Supp. 1989).
44. Section 245A(a)(2)(B) provides:
In the case of an alien who entered the United States as a nonimmigrant before Janu-
ary 1, 1982, the alien must establish that the alien's period of authorized stay as a
nonimmigrant expired before such date through the passage of time or the alien's
unlawful status was known to the Government as of that date.
Id. § 245A(a)(2)(B), 8 U.S.C. § 1255a(a)(2)(B).
45. Section 245A(a)(3)(A) provides that an "alien must establish that the alien has been
continuously physically present in the United States since November 6, 1986." Id.
§ 245A(a)(3)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1255a(a)(3)(A).
46. Section 245A(a)(4) provides:
The alien must establish that he-
(A) is admissible to the United States as an immigrant ...
(B) has not been convicted of any felony or of three or more misdemeanors
committed in the United States,
(C) has not assisted in the persecution of any person or persons on account of
race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political
opinion, and
(D) is registered or registering under the Military Selective Service Act ... if
the alien is required to be so registered under the Act.
Id. § 245A(a)(4), 8 U.S.C. § 1255a(a)(4).
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IRCA is not complete. After a certain period of time,47 temporary
residents may seek adjustment to permanent resident status.48 As
previously noted, permanent resident status is usually a prerequisite
to obtaining United States citizenship. 49 Temporary residents must
satisfy four requirements to gain lawful permanent resident status
under the IRCA. First, aliens must timely apply for permanent resi-
dent status.50 Second, aliens must have continuously resided in the
United States during their period of temporary residence. 5' Third,
aliens must show that they are admissible as immigrants.52 Fourth,
aliens must possess basic citizenship skills. 53
E. The Controversy
Pursuant to the IRCA,54 the United States Attorney General-
through the Immigration and Naturalization Service ("INS")-issued
47. See id. § 245A(b)(1)(A). This section requires applicants for permanent residency
under the IRCA to seek adjustment during a one-year period "beginning with the nineteenth
month that begins after the date the alien was granted such temporary resident status." Id.
§ 245A(b)(1)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1255a(b)(1)(A).
48. See id. § 245A(b), 8 U.S.C. § 1255a(b).
49. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
50. Section 245A(b)(l)(A) provides that an "alien must apply for such adjustment during
the one-year period beginning with the nineteenth month that begins after the date the alien
was granted such temporary resident status." Immigration Reform & Control Act
§ 245A(b)(l)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1255a(b)(l)(A) (Supp. 1989).
51. Section 245A(b)(1)(B)(i) provides that an "alien must establish that he has continu-
ously resided in the United States since the date the alien was granted such temporary resident
status." Id. § 245A(b)(1)(B)(i), 8 U.S.C. § 1255a(b)(l)(B)(i).
52. Section 245A(b)(1)(C) provides that an "alien must establish that he (i) is admissible
to the United States as an immigrant ... and (ii) has not been convicted of any felony or three
or more misdemeanors committed in the United States." Id. § 245A(b)(I)(C), 8 U.S.C.
§ 1255a(b)(l)(C).
53. Section 245A(b)(1)(D) lists several basic citizenship skills which are required to ob-
tain permanent resident status under the IRCA. According to this provision,
(i) The alien must demonstrate that he either-
(I) meets the requirements of section 312 (relating to minimal understanding
of ordinary English and a knowledge and understanding of the history and gov-
ernment of the United States), or
(II) is satisfactorily pursuing a course of study (recognized by the Attorney
General) to achieve such an understanding of English and such a knowledge and
understanding of the history and government of the United States.
(ii) The Attorney General may, in his discretion, waive all or part of the require-
ments of clause (i) in the case of an alien who is 65 years of age or older.
(iii) In accordance with regulations of the Attorney General, an alien who has
demonstrated under clause (i)(I) that the alien meets the requirements of section 312
may be considered to have satisfied the requirements of that section for purposes of
becoming naturalized as a citizen of the United States under title III.
Id. § 245A(b)(1)(D), 8 U.S.C. § 1255a(b)(l)(D).
54. See id. § 245A(g)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1255a(g)(1).
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several regulations in an attempt to implement the IRCA. 55 In some
instances, however, the INS improperly interpreted certain provisions
of the IRCA. As a result, many undocumented aliens were actually
discouraged from applying for legalization under the IRCA's tempo-
rary residence requirements. 56 A great deal of litigation has recently
arisen over the power of the judiciary to forge equitable remedies
where INS regulations fail to properly execute the enabling provisions
of the IRCA.
5 7
This Comment first examines the reasoning behind two recent
federal cases which attempted to forge equitable remedies after find-
ing that undocumented aliens were injured by the INS's faulty inter-
pretation of the IRCA. This Comment then surveys the history of
judicial involvement in the field of immigration and naturalization
law, contrasting this history with a recent United States Supreme
Court decision, INS v. Pangilinan.58 The government argues that the
Pangilinan case forecloses all equitable relief against the executive
branch in immigration and naturalization law. However, this Com-
ment distinguishes Pangilinan from the great weight of judicial au-
thority and demonstrates that this case does not foreclose the
equitable remedy of extending the filing deadline for temporary resi-
dence under the IRCA when the INS fails to properly implement the
statute.
III. CASES WHERE ALIENS HAVE SUCCESSFULLY CHALLENGED
THE INS REGULATIONS UNDER THE IRCA
In two recent cases, federal courts determined that INS regula-
tions failed to properly execute Congress' express public policy as set
out in the IRCA. 59 In each of these cases, the respective district
courts found that the INS regulations were inconsistent with the
IRCA's plain language or the express legislative history behind the
55. See, e.g., 8 C.F.R. § 245a.1(d) & (g) (1989).
56. For example, the INS's improper regulations defining when an amnesty applicant is
likely to become a "public charge" under the IRCA may impact as many as 56,000 persons.
66 INTERPRETER RELEASES 876 (Aug. 7, 1989).
57. See Ayuda, Inc. v. Meese, 687 F. Supp. 650 (D.D.C. 1988), rev'd sub nom. Ayuda,
Inc. v. Thornburgh, 880 F.2d 1325 (D.C. Cir. 1989). See also Zambrano v. INS, No. S-88 Civ.
455 EJG (E.D. Cal. Aug. 9, 1988); League of United Latin American Citizens v. INS, No. 87
Civ. 4757 WDK (C.D. Cal. Aug. 12, 1988); Catholic Social Services, Inc. v. Meese, 685 F.
Supp. 1149 (E.D. Cal. 1988), enforcing No. S-86 Civ. 1343 LKK (E.D. Cal. Aug. 11, 1988).
58. 108 S. Ct. 2210 (1988).
59. See Ayuda, 687 F. Supp. at 650. See also Catholic Social Services, 685 F. Supp. at
1149.
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IRCA.6o
A. The Ayuda Case
The temporary residence provisions of the IRCA require un-
documented aliens who apply for temporary resident status to estab-
lish that they have resided in the United States illegally since January
1, 1982.61 In addition, those aliens who entered on non-immigrant
visas must also establish that, either: (1) their period of authorized
stay expired before January 1, 1982; or (2) they violated the terms of
their visa and that their "unlawful status was known to the
[g]overnment" as of January 1, 1982.62
Before discussing the legal aspects of the INS's regulation that
purported to define the statutory phrase "known to the govern-
ment,"' 63 some factual background on the agency's drafting process is
necessary. In March 1987, the INS issued public notice that it in-
tended to promulgate rules and regulations to administer the IRCA.
64
In this notice, the INS proposed a restrictive interpretation of the
phrase "known to the government" which would require that an
alien's illegal status be known to the INS, regardless of whether the
alien's status was known to other federal agencies.65 In response to
the proposal, the INS received ninety-one comments addressing this
issue.66 Each response criticized the INS's restrictive interpretation
and favored a broader view of the term "government" that encom-
passed all federal agencies. 67 Nevertheless, in drafting the regulation,
the INS disregarded public comment and adhered to its original defi-
nition that the term "government" referred only to the INS in the
60. Id.
61. See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
62. See Ayuda, Inc. v. Meese, 687 F. Supp. 650, 652-53 (D.D.C. 1988), rev'd sub nom.
Ayuda, Inc. v. Thornburgh, 880 F.2d 1325 (D.C. Cir. 1989). See also supra note 44 and ac-
companying text.
63. Specifically, this section shall concentrate on the INS's interpretation of the "known
to the Government" language in section 245A(a)(2)(B) of the IRCA. Immigration Reform &
Control Act § 245A(a)(2)(B), 8 U.S.C. § 1255a(a)(2)(B) (Supp. 1989). The INS eventually
defined this term in 8 C.F.R. § 245a.l(d) (1989).
64. Adjustment of Status for Certain Aliens, 52 Fed. Reg. 8,752 (1987).
65. Ayuda, 687 F. Supp. at 653.
66. Id.
67. Ayuda, Inc. v. Meese, 687 F. Supp. 650, 653 (D.D.C. 1988), rev'd sub nom. Ayuda,
Inc. v. Thornburgh, 880 F.2d 1325 (D.C. Cir. 1989). According to the INS, many of the
responses favored expanding the definition of "known to the government" to include state and
local agencies. Id.
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context of the phrase "known to the government. '68
The INS regulation specified four alternative methods by which
an alien's unlawful status could be "known to the government" within
the terms of the IRCA. Under the regulation, if an alien satisfies any
of these tests, he or she meets the IRCA's "known to the govern-
ment" requirement. 69 First, the INS must have received factual infor-
mation of the alien's violation of his or her status and this information
must have been stored in the INS's "official" file prior to January 1,
1982.70 Second, the INS must have made a determinative finding,
prior to January 1, 1982, that the alien was deportable. 71 Third, the
INS, in response to another government agency request, must have
decided that the particular alien had no legal status in the United
States .72 Fourth, the INS must have received proof from certain
68. See 8 C.F.R. § 245a. l(d) (1989). As a matter of construction, although an undocu-
mented alien's status may be known to other federal agencies, under the INS's restrictive view,
this fact is irrelevant for those who violated non-immigrant visas prior to January 1, 1982, and
resided in the United States continuously since that date.
69. See id.
70. See Ayuda, 687 F. Supp. at 653. In addition, 8 C.F.R. § 245a.l(d)(1) states:
The [INS] received factual information constituting a violation of the alien's nonim-
migrant status from any agency, bureau or department, or subdivision thereof, of the
Federal government, and such information was stored or otherwise recorded in the
official [INS] alien file, whether or not the [INS] took follow-up action on the infor-
mation received. In order to meet the standard of "information constituting a viola-
tion of the alien's nonimmigrant status," the alien must have made a clear statement
or declaration to the other federal agency, bureau or department that he or she was
in violation of nonimmigrant status ....
8 C.F.R. § 245a.l(d)(l) (1989).
71. See Ayuda, 687 F. Supp. at 653. In addition, 8 C.F.R. § 245a.l(d)(2) states:
An affirmative determination was made by the [INS] prior to January 1, 1982 that
the alien was subject to deportation proceedings. Evidence that may be presented by
an alien to support an assertion that such a determination was made may include, but
is not limited to, official [INS] documents issued prior to January 1, 1982, i.e., Forms
1-94, Arrival-Departure Records granting a period of time in which to depart the
United States without imposition of proceedings; Form 1-210, Voluntary Departure
Notice Letter; and Forms 1-221, Order to Show Cause and Notice of Hearing. Evi-
dence from [INS] records that may be used to support a finding that such a determi-
nation was made may include, but is not limited to, record copies of the
aforementioned forms and other documents contained in alien files, i.e., Forms 1-213,
Record of Deportable Alien;
Unexecuted Forms 1-205, Warrant of Deportation; Forms 1-265, Application
for Order to Show Cause and Processing Sheet; Form 1-541, Order of Denial of
Application for Extension of Stay granting a period of time in which to depart the
United States without imposition of proceeding, or any other [INS] record reflecting
that the alien's nonimmigrant status was considered by the [INS] to have terminated
or the alien was otherwise determined to be subject to deportation proceedings prior
to January 1, 1982, whether or not deportation proceedings were instituted ....
8 C.F.R. § 245a.l(d)(2) (1989).
72. See Ayuda, Inc. v. Meese, 687 F. Supp. 650, 653 (D.D.C. 1988), rev'd sub nom.
Ayuda, Inc. v. Thornburgh, 880 F.2d 1325 (D.C. Cir. 1989). In addition, 8 C.F.R.
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schools that a student-alien violated the terms of his or her non-immi-
grant status prior to January 1, 1982.
73
The INS's interpretation of the phrase "known to the govern-
ment" was challenged in Ayuda, Inc. v. Meese.74 In Ayuda, five indi-
viduals and four organizational plaintiffs filed a class action suit
asking the district court to enjoin the INS's restrictive interpretation
of the IRCA's "known to the government" requirement. 75 The case
was filed in the United States District Court for the District of Co-
lumbia where Judge Sporkin presided.76 Over time, the class grew to
encompass as many as 6,000 aliens.77
The plaintiffs in Ayuda contended that the INS's restrictive regu-
lations unlawfully precluded INS officials from relying on relevant ev-
idence not in the direct possession of the INS. 78 Further, the plaintiffs
pointed out that the INS regulations proscribed the use of many gov-
ernment records which could satisfy the "known to the government"
language in the IRCA.79
§ 245a.l(d)(3) states that "[a] copy of a response by the [INS] to any other agency which
advised that agency that a particular alien had no legal status in the United States or for whom
no record could be found." 8 C.F.R. § 245a.l(d)(3) (1989).
73. See 8 C.F.R. § 245a.l(d)(4) which states:
The applicant produces documentation from a school approved to enroll foreign stu-
dents under § 214.3 which establishes that the said school forwarded to the [INS] a
report that clearly indicated the applicant had violated his or her nonimmigrant stu-
dent status prior to January 1, 1982. A school may submit an affirmation that the
school did forward to the [INS] the aforementioned report and that the school no
longer has available copies of the actual documentation sent. In order to be eligible
under this part, the applicant must not have been reinstated to nonimmigrant student
status.
8 C.F.R. § 245a.l(d)(4) (1989).
An INS witness confirmed that, under this exception only, the "INS will accept such
information showing the unlawful status of the nonimmigrant submitted by the institution
after January 1, 1982, so long as the information pertained to the period before January 1,
1982." 65 INTERPRETER RELEASES 347 (Apr. 4, 1988).
74. 687 F. Supp. 650 (D.D.C. 1988), rev'd sub nom. Ayuda, Inc. v. Thornburgh, 880 F.2d
1325 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
75. Id. at 654. The five individual plaintiffs were part of "a nationwide class consisting of
aliens who would otherwise be eligible for legalization except for the INS's interpretation of
the 'known to the government' requirement in the IRCA." Id. The organizational plaintiffs'
activities were primarily devoted to immigration assistance. Id.
76. Id. at 650.
77. 65 INTERPRETER RELEASES 1131 (Oct. 31, 1988). As of the date of publication, this
newsletter reported that about 6,000 persons had applied for legalization under Ayuda. Plain-
tiffs' counsel expected more persons to apply before the November 15, 1988 filing deadline due
to a report on Ayuda that was broadcast on a national Spanish cable television network. Id.
78. See Ayuda, 687 F. Supp. at 651.
79. Ayuda, Inc. v. Meese, 687 F. Supp. 650, 651 (D.D.C. 1988), rev'd sub nom. Ayuda,
Inc. v. Thornburgh, 880 F.2d 1325 (D.C. Cir. 1989). The plaintiffs specifically noted that 8
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Initially, the plaintiffs sought a preliminary injunction against the
INS's enforcement of the allegedly erroneous regulations.8 0 In decid-
ing whether to issue a preliminary injunction, the court applied the
standard four-part test for injunctive relief.8t For a preliminary in-
junction to issue, the party seeking relief must demonstrate that "(1)
it is likely to prevail on the merits; (2) it will suffer irreparable harm if
the preliminary relief is not granted; (3) harm to others will not result
if the relief is granted; and (4) granting the injunction is in the public
interest."
8 2
The plaintiffs raised two major arguments in order to satisfy the
first prong of the preliminary injunction test. First, the plaintiffs
claimed that the INS's interpretation violated the plain meaning of
the IRCA.8 3 Second, the plaintiffs asserted that the INS unlawfully
and unreasonably excluded individuals protected by the IRCA from
seeking legal immigrant status.8
4
In rebuttal, the INS argued various points. First, the INS main-
tained that the IRCA required the INS to interpret the phrase
"known to the government" to mean "known to the INS."85 Second,
the INS asserted that Congress did not distinguish between the terms
"government" and "statute" within the IRCA.8 6 Finally, the INS
contended that Congress did not intend to legally admit the class of
aliens bringing the action in Ayuda.87
Concerning the plaintiffs' likely success on the merits, Judge
Sporkin narrowed the legal issue before him to whether the INS's in-
terpretation of the provision was lawful.88 To determine whether the
interpretation was lawful, Judge Sporkin applied the two-step statu-
tory construction analysis prescribed by the United States Supreme
Court in Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council,
C.F.R. § 245a.1(d) precludes the use of records from the Internal Revenue Service and the
Social Security Administration to satisfy the "known to the government" language in 8 U.S.C.
§ 1255a(a)(2)(B). Ayuda, 687 F. Supp. at 651.
80. Ayuda, 687 F. Supp. at 651.
81. Id. at 660. The court adopted the four-part test established by the District of Colum-
bia Circuit. See Washington Metropolitan Transit Commission v. Holiday Tours, 559 F.2d
841 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
82. Ayuda, 687 F. Supp. at 660.
83. See id. at 651.
84. Ayuda, Inc. v. Meese, 687 F. Supp. 650, 651 (D.D.C. 1988), rev'd sub nom. Ayuda,
Inc. v. Thornburgh, 880 F.2d 1325 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
85. Id.
86. Id. at 661.
87. Id. at 664.
88. Id. at 660.
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Inc.89
According to the Supreme Court,90 federal courts must consider
two questions when analyzing the administration of congressional
acts.91 First, courts should consider whether Congress has directly
spoken to the contested issue.92 If Congress' intent is clear from the
statute, that is the end of the inquiry since congressional intent con-
trols.93 Second, if Congress has not specifically addressed the issue,
courts should consider whether the administrative agency's construc-
tion of the statute is permissible. 94 The judiciary must apply a strong
presumption favoring the administrative agency's interpretation un-
less the interpretation is contrary to the expressed legislative intent.95
Judge Sporkin found the regulation deficient under the first
prong of the Chevron test. He noted that there is a "powerful pre-
sumption" favoring the plain meaning of the words that Congress
uses in a statute.96 Judge Sporkin reasoned that "the ordinary mean-
ing of the word '[g]overnment' is not usually taken to mean 'INS.' -97
Judge Sporkin also noted that the statute as a whole undercuts
the INS's interpretation.98 He asserted that Congress exhibited its
ability to differentiate between the two terms throughout the IRCA.99
While Congress made numerous references to the INS in the IRCA,
Judge Sporkin found it significant that, in this instance, Congress
chose to use the term "[g]overnment."'0 Moreover, Judge Sporkin
found that the INS could not overcome its burden of proof in the
absence of evidence contradicting the plain meaning of the IRCA.1 01
Judge Sporkin reinforced his ruling by addressing the second
prong of the Chevron test and found that the INS failed to support its
89. Ayuda, Inc. v. Meese, 687 F. Supp. 650, 660 (D.D.C. 1988), rev'd sub nom. Ayuda,
Inc. v. Thornburgh, 880 F.2d 1325 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
90. See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837,
842-43 (1984).
91. Id.
92. Ayuda, 687 F. Supp. at 660.
93. See id. at 661.
94. Ayuda, Inc. v. Meese, 687 F. Supp. 650, 661 (D.D.C. 1988), rev'd sub nom. Ayuda,
Inc. v. Thornburgh, 880 F.2d 1325 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
95. Id. at 663.
96. Id. at 661.
97. Id.
98. See id.
99. Ayuda, Inc. v. Meese, 687 F. Supp. 650, 661 (D.D.C. 1988), rev'd sub nom. Ayuda,
Inc. v. Thornburgh, 880 F.2d 1325 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
100. Id.
101. Id. at 662.
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contention that Congress intended to exclude plaintiffs from becom-
ing citizens. 02 Judge Sporkin determined that the legislative history
clearly suggested that Congress did not intend for the phrase "known
to the government" to be construed in an unduly restrictive fash-
ion.103 Rather, Judge Sporkin noted, Congress inserted the phrase to
safeguard against fraud.104 By placing the burden of proof on appli-
cants to show that a government agency had documented his or her
illegal status, Congress established an easily enforceable statutory
"bright line" that would help prevent fraudulent claims.105 Congres-
sional authorization of increased criminal penalties for fraudulent
claims bolsters Judge Sporkin's reasoning. 10 6 Moreover, the IRCA's
legislative history shows that members of Congress felt that a liberally
administered, one-time legalization program was an essential part of
any enforceable immigration reform. 107
Under Judge Sporkin's reading of the legislative history, the
court found that the scope of the INS's interpretation was impermissi-
bly narrow. Judge Sporkin noted that "under the interpretation of
'known to the government' urged by INS, no alien would ever be eli-
gible; he would either have been deported or would not be able to
document his presence due to gaps in INS's record keeping."'' 0 8
As this language suggests, Judge Sporkin ultimately viewed the
INS's regulation as effectively dismissing all amnesty claims under
this regulation. 10 9 First, Judge Sporkin found the requirement that
the INS must possess factual information in its official file unrealistic
because it virtually required a non-immigrant alien to confess his or
her unlawful status to a federal agency."10 Second, Judge Sporkin
found that few aliens, deemed deportable by the INS but still residing
in the United States, were in a position to benefit from the provisions
102. Id. at 663.
103. Id. at 664.
104. Ayuda, Inc. v. Meese, 687 F. Supp. 650, 664 (D.D.C. 1988), rev'd sub nom. Ayuda,
Inc. v. Thornburgh, 880 F.2d 1325 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
105. Id.
106. See Judiciary Committee Report, supra note 14, at 94. Section 102 of the IRCA in-
creases fines-from $2,000 to $5,000-for knowing use of fraudulent identification documents
and false statements made to satisfy the employment verification process of the IRCA. Immi-
gration Reform & Control Act § 102, 18 U.S.C. § 1546 (Supp. 1989).
107. Judiciary Committee Report, supra note 14, at 49.
108. Ayuda, 687 F. Supp. at 665 (citing Farzad v. Chandler, 670 F. Supp. 690, 694 (N.D.
Tex. 1987)).
109. Ayuda, Inc. v. Meese, 687 F. Supp. 650, 664-65 (D.D.C. 1988), rev'd sub nom.
Ayuda, Inc. v. Thornburgh, 880 F.2d 1325 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
110. Id. at 664.
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of the IRCA.II Finally, Judge Sporkin found that the third require-
ment-that the INS must have affirmatively advised another agency
that an alien did not have legal status-added little to the first two
conditions. " 12
Thus, Judge Sporkin held that the INS improperly construed the
"known to the government" requirement and that the plaintiffs were
likely to succeed on the merits.' 1 3 The plaintiffs also demonstrated to
the court that the other three prerequisites to the issuance of a prelim-
inary injunction were satisfied. 1 14 As a result, the court enjoined the
INS from enforcing its definition of the statutory phrase "known to
the government." 
15
After Judge Sporkin's decision in Ayuda, the proper interpreta-
tion of the phrase "known to the government" appeared to be settled.
In fact, within weeks of Judge Sporkin's initial ruling, the government
accepted the ruling and announced that it would not appeal this
issue. 116
Besides granting injunctive relief, Judge Sporkin also retained ju-
risdiction over the case to grant prospective relief to undocumented
aliens who were misled or dissuaded from applying for temporary res-
ident status due to the INS's erroneous interpretation of the IRCA.
117
111. Id.
112. Id. at 665. The INS added a fourth possible method of satisfying the "known to the
government" language in 8 U.S.C. § 1255a(a)(2)(B) after the district court decided Ayuda.
113. Ayuda, 687 F. Supp. at 665.
114. See Ayuda, Inc. v. Meese, 687 F. Supp. 650, 665-66 (D.D.C. 1988), rev'd sub nom.
Ayuda, Inc. v. Thornburgh, 880 F.2d 1325 (D.C. Cir. 1989). The Ayuda court found that
failure to issue a preliminary injunction would irreparably injure the plaintiffs. Id. at 665. The
court further reasoned that the INS's faulty regulations would continue to deter many undocu-
mented aliens from applying for amnesty since they reasonably believed that filing an applica-
tion would be a futile act. Id.
The Ayuda court also found that the INS would not be prejudiced by the issuance of a
preliminary injunction. Id. at 666. The court reasoned that "the substantial injury that will be
suffered by organizational plaintiffs and the beneficiaries of [the IRCA]" outweighed any mi-
nor inconvenience to the INS. Id.
Finally, Judge Sporkin noted that the issuance of a preliminary injunction was "clearly in
the public interest because it carries out the purposes of [the IRCA] and strikes down an
interpretation of [the IRCA] that is contrary to law." Id.
115. Id. at 666-67. Judge Sporkin issued a preliminary injunction on March 30, 1988. Id.
at 666. Sporkin issued a supplemental order on April 7, 1988, that permanently enjoined the
INS from any further application of the phrase "unlawful status was known to the govern-
ment," as used in 8 U.S.C. § 1255a, except as permitted by the court. Id. at 667.
116. 65 INTERPRETER RELEASES 590 (June 6, 1988).
117. See id. at 785 (Aug. 8, 1988). The court certified three classes of aliens who were
eligible to apply for prospective remedies under Ayuda. The three categories were: (1) aliens
admitted to the United States as non-immigrants and who violated the conditions of their
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Because the May 4, 1988 application deadline for temporary resident
status expired soon after his decision in Ayuda,1 8 Judge Sporkin ex-
plored other methods of providing relief for the injured classes of
plaintiffs. 119
Under the terms of his supplemental order to Ayuda, Judge
Sporkin placed the initial burden of individually applying for relief on
the eligible aliens. 120 One or more Special Masters would then review
the individual claims by conducting investigations and making non-
binding recommendations to the court on what relief, if any, would be
appropriate. 12' Before the case went up on appeal, Judge Sporkin be-
gan to implement extensive procedures to consider appropriate pro-
spective relief. However, the Ayuda court has delayed granting any
affirmative prospective relief until after the appeal.
122
B. The Catholic Social Services Case
The "known to the government" provision in the IRCA is not
the only statutory term in the IRCA improperly defined by the INS.
As previously noted, in order for undocumented aliens to gain tempo-
admission; (2) aliens who lived in the United States before January 1, 1982, but wilfully failed
to file the required quarterly or annual alien registration forms with the INS during that time;
and (3) aliens absent from the United States whose legalization application had been denied by
the INS under the prior construction of the "known to the government" provisions or who
were informed that their applications would be denied based on the INS's construction. Id.
118. Ayuda was decided on March 30, 1988. The filing deadline to seek temporary resi-
dent status under the IRCA was May 4, 1988. Id.
119. Ayuda, Inc. v. Meese, 687 F. Supp. 650, 673-74 (D.D.C. 1988), rev'd sub nom.
Ayuda, Inc. v. Thornburgh, 880 F.2d 1325 (D.C. Cir. 1989). Judge Sporkin announced that
applicants were to submit declarations explaining why they missed the May 4, 1988 deadline.
Id. Such declarations were required to establish one of the following reasons for delay: (1) the
INS, or one of its duly authorized agents, advised the alien that he or she was not eligible for
legalization; (2) the INS, or any of its agents, misled the alien in some way; or (3) the alien was
unaware of the changes in the INS's regulation. Id. Also, to assist in providing relief, Judge
Sporkin appointed a Special Master, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 53. See
Supplemental Order of September 27, 1988, in 65 INTERPRETER RELEASES 1012-14 (Oct. 3,
1988).
120. Id. at 1131 (Oct. 31, 1988). Sporkin eventually extended the deadline to apply for
possible relief until November 15, 1988. By late October, approximately 6,000 undocumented
aliens actually applied for relief based on Ayuda. Id.
121. See supra note 119.
122. The District of Columbia Circuit, in a split decision, subsequently reversed the case
due to the lack of subject matter jurisdiction. See Ayuda v. Thornburgh, 880 F.2d 1325 (D.C.
Cir. 1988). The panel also denied the plaintiffs' request for rehearing on this issue. 67 INTER-
PRETER RELEASES 34 (Jan. 8, 1990). Finally, the full District of Columbia Circuit, sitting en
banc, rejected the plaintiffs' rehearing request. Id. Nevertheless, this litigation is not yet final
because the plaintiffs recently petitioned for certiorari with the Supreme Court on December
27, 1989. Id. at 33.
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rary resident status under the IRCA, they must have been continu-
ously physically present in the United States since November 6,
1986.123 However, the IRCA expressly permits aliens to take "brief,
casual and innocent" absences from the United States without dis-
rupting their continuous physical presence for purposes of the
IRCA. '
24
The INS, pursuant to its regulatory authority, adopted a regula-
tion purporting to define the IRCA's reference to a "brief, casual, and
innocent" absence.' 25 The regulation narrowly defined "brief, casual,
and innocent" absences as those absences that were: (1) after May 1,
1987; (2) for not greater than thirty days; (3) for legitimate emergency
or humanitarian purposes; and (4) expressly authorized by the INS. 126
Under this regulation, undocumented aliens who left the United
States for any length of time without INS permission could not take
advantage of the amnesty provisions of the IRCA.' 2
7
In Catholic Social Services, Inc. v. Meese,' 28 the plaintiffs chal-
lenged the INS's interpretation of the "brief, casual, and innocent"
language in the IRCA.1 29 As in Ayuda, the court applied the two-
tiered statutory construction analysis applied by the Supreme Court
123. See supra note 45 and accompanying text. This provision is distinct from the IRCA's
continuous residency requirement contested in Ayuda. That provision demanded continuous
residence beginning in 1982. In contrast, section 245A(a)(3)(A) applies a stricter requirement
of physical presence for a much shorter period of time (since November 6, 1986). Immigration
Reform & Control Act § 245A(a)(3)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1255a(a)(3)(A) (Supp. 1989).
124. Section 245A(a)(3)(B) states that "[a]n alien shall not be considered to have failed to
maintain continuous physical presence in the United States for purposes of [8 U.S.C.
§ 1255a(a)(3)(A)] by virtue of brief, casual, and innocent absences from the United States."
Id. § 245A(a)(3)(B), 8 U.S.C. § 1255a(a)(3)(B).
125. See 8 C.F.R. § 245a.l(g) which states:
"Brief, casual, and innocent" means a departure authorized by the [INS] (advance
parole) subsequent to May 1, 1987 of not more than thirty (30) days for legitimate
emergency or humanitarian purposes unless a further period of authorized departure
has been granted in the discretion of the district director or a departure was beyond
the alien's control.
8 C.F.R. § 245a.l(g) (1989).
126. Id. Note that the INS regulation did not require express authorization for absences
from the United States between November 6, 1986 and April 30, 1987. See Catholic Social
Services, Inc. v. Meese, 685 F. Supp. 1149, 1151 (E.D. Cal. 1988).
127. Catholic Social Services, 685 F. Supp. at 1155-56.
128. 685 F. Supp. 1149 (E.D. Cal. 1988). The certified plaintiff class was defined as "all
persons prima facie eligible for legalization under [8 U.S.C. § 1255a] who departed and reen-
tered the U.S. without INS authorization (i.e. advance parole) after the enactment of the
IRCA following what they assert to have been a brief, casual, and innocent absence from the
U.S." 65 INTERPRETER RELEASES 1011 (Oct. 3, 1988). The class includes an estimated
25,000 undocumented aliens. Id. at 611 (June 13, 1988).
129. Catholic Social Services, 685 F. Supp. at 1152.
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in Chevron, USA., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. 130
Using this analysis, the court first looked to the plain meaning of the
statutory language "brief, casual, and innocent."' 131 United States
District Judge Lawrence Karlton, who presided over the case, noted
that the terms "brief, casual, and innocent" lacked any clear and ordi-
nary meaning,1 32 and held that the provision's plain meaning was
inconclusive. 133
Since the provision's plain meaning was inconclusive, the court
turned to the second prong of the Chevron test. 134 Under this prong,
as Judge Karlton noted, courts must defer to an administrative
agency's statutory interpretation unless the agency's view is clearly
contrary to the expressed legislative intent.135
As in Ayuda, Judge Karlton determined that Congress intended
that the legalization program in the IRCA should be generously and
liberally construed.' 36 Consequently, the court found that the INS's
regulation improperly applied the statute for several reasons. 137 The
first of these reasons was that there was no statutory basis to distin-
guish between "brief, casual, and innocent" absences which took
place before May 1, 1987, from absences that occurred after that
date. 138
Judge Karlton also stated that the regulation would lead to re-
sults that were inconsistent with the congressional purpose. 139 He
found that Congress understood that illegal aliens naturally fear the
INS. 140 Since Congress intended to liberally apply the legalization
program, an administrative regulation requiring undocumented aliens
who briefly leave the United States to obtain INS permission would
130. Id. The Catholic Social Services court noted that this test was subsequently followed,
in an immigration law context, by the Supreme Court in INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S.
421 (1987). Catholic Social Services, 685 F. Supp. at 1152.
131. Catholic Social Services, 685 F. Supp. at 1152.
132. Id. at 1153.
133. Catholic Social Services v. Meese, 685 F. Supp. 1149, 1153 (E.D. Cal. 1988). More-
over, Judge Karlton found no prior binding statutory construction of the contested terms evi-
dent within the IRCA. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 1152.
136. For the court's discussion of the legislative history underlying the IRCA's legaliza-
tion provisions, see Catholic Social Services, 685 F. Supp. at 1153-55. The court's appraisal is
similar to Judge Sporkin's analysis in Ayuda.
137. Id. at 1155.
138. Catholic Social Services, Inc. v. Meese, 685 F. Supp. 1149, 1155 (E.D. Cal. 1988).
139. Id.
140. Id. at 1156.
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effectively read "the 'brief, casual, and innocent' absence exception
out of the statute entirely."' 141 Moreover, the court noted that Con-
gress could have imposed an INS consent restriction, but chose not to
add such a constraint.1 42 Judge Karlton further rejected the INS's
argument that an undocumented alien's reentry into the United States
was unlawful within the meaning of the IRCA, thereby violating the
"innocent" factor of the statutory phrase.1 43 The court cited several
decisions holding that mere unlawful entry was not "non-innocent"
conduct. 144
Finally, the court reasoned that deference was not appropriate
due to the executive branch's inconsistent application of the phrase
"brief, casual, and innocent."' 45 First, the interpretation was not con-
sistent with the historic context of the phrase.1 46 When Congress
passed the IRCA, it recognized that this phrase had a historic mean-
ing and used the phrase consistently with that meaning.14 7 Second,
the INS failed to consistently apply the phrase within the IRCA's
statutory scheme.148 In other IRCA provisions authorizing "brief,
casual, and innocent" absences, a lack of INS consent does not auto-
matically harm undocumented aliens.149
After determining that the INS's definition of "brief, casual, and
innocent" was contrary to the congressional purpose behind the
IRCA, Judge Karlton enjoined the INS from enforcing the regula-
tion.150 As in Ayuda, mere retrospective relief was not an adequate
141. Id. Judge Karlton noted Congress' "express recognition of and concern about the
problem of getting undocumented aliens to come forward to participate in the program makes
it highly unlikely that Congress intended to require such aliens to seek INS permission to leave
the country prior to the time their legalization applications were filed." Id.
142. Id. at 1156-57.
143. Catholic Social Services, Inc. v. Meese, 685 F. Supp. 1149, 1158 (E.D. Cal. 1988).
144. Id. at 1158-59. The court cited several cases, including Git Foo Wong v. INS, 358
F.2d 151, 153-54 (9th Cir. 1966), and de Gallardo v. INS, 624 F.2d 85, 87 (9th Cir. 1980). The
court distinguished examples of implicitly deceptive reentry-which violated public immigra-
tion policy-as violative of the "innocent" factor in the IRCA. Catholic Social Services, 685 F.
Supp. at 1158-59.
145. Catholic Social Services, 685 F. Supp. at 1157.
146. Id. at 1158.
147. Id.
148. Catholic Social Services, Inc. v. Meese, 685 F. Supp. 1149, 1157 (E.D. Cal. 1988).
149. Id. For example, 8 U.S.C. § 1244 included "brief, casual, and innocent" language in
a suspension of deportation statute. However, the INS admitted that "brief, casual, and inno-
cent" absences without INS consent did not automatically make aliens ineligible for suspen-
sion of deportation. Catholic Social Services, 685 F. Supp. at 1157.
150. Id. at 1153. The court upheld the plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment and inval-
idated the regulation. Id. The INS did not challenge the district court's decision to invalidate
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remedy for those undocumented immigrants who were deterred from
applying for temporary resident status due to the INS's faulty inter-
pretation. 5 1 In a supplemental order, Judge Karlton ordered the INS
to accept legalization applications from members of the plaintiff class
for several months after the May 4, 1988 filing deadline had
expired. 15
2
IV. THE HISTORICAL ROLE OF THE JUDICIARY IN IMMIGRATION
AND NATURALIZATION LAW
The judiciary's historical role in immigration and naturalization
law matters is unique. Our constitutional system provides for judicial
review of the executive and legislative branches. 53 Nevertheless, the
courts have developed certain judicial rules out of respect for the sep-
aration of powers which thereby provide heightened deference to the
political branches when individuals challenge congressional statutes
or the administrative branch's lawful enforcement of such statutes.
A. Judicial Deference to the Political Branches
To a certain extent, immigration law and naturalization law are
distinct. 54 While immigration law regulates the entry of aliens, natu-
ralization law prescribes terms for non-citizens to obtain citizen-
ship.155 Nevertheless, these fields are closely related and
interdependent. 5 6 While naturalization and immigration powers are
both inherent sovereign powers, 157 the federal government's naturali-
zation powers are also expressly set forth in the Constitution. 158
the INS's construction of the "brief, casual, and innocent" provision of IRCA
§ 245A(a)(3)(B). Catholic Social Services, 685 F. Supp. at 1159-60.
151. Since Catholic Social Services was decided only one day before the amnesiy deadline
expired, injured plaintiffs clearly had an insufficient amount of time to apply for amnesty.
152. 65 INTERPRETER RELEASES 1011 (Oct. 3, 1988). Under the supplemental order, the
INS could require applicants to show prima facie eligibility for legalization under Catholic
Social Services. Id. The court confirmed its order despite the intervening Supreme Court opin-
ion in INS v. Pangilinan, 108 S. Ct. 2210 (1988). 65 INTERPRETER RELEASES at 1011.
153. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (I Cranch.) 137 (1803).
154. C. GORDON & S. MAILMAN, supra note 2, § 14.1.
155. Id.
156. Id. § 11.2. Due to this interrelationship, the federal government combined the ad-
ministration of immigration and naturalization law through the Immigration and Nationality
Act of 1952.
157. Id. § 14.1.
158. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4.
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1. The Naturalization Clause Does Not Require Absolute Judicial
Deference
The United States Constitution provides that "Congress shall
have Power To ... establish an Uniform Rule of Naturalization."' 59
To discern the Framers' intended meaning of this clause, one must
first examine the provision's historical purposes. During the early
years of the Republic, this country was governed under the Articles of
Confederation. 160 Under the Articles, each state separately regulated
naturalization procedures. 161 This situation resulted in varied natu-
ralization regulations and proved unsatisfactory. 162 Therefore, in or-
der to promote uniformity, the Framers shifted naturalization powers
from the states to the federal government. 63
The Constitution, in article I, section 8, enumerates various con-
gressional powers.164 These powers are, however, subject to tradi-
tional standards of judicial review. 65  Therefore, the mere
enumeration of a congressional power in the Constitution cannot
override the separation of powers doctrine. 66 For example, article I,
section 8, clause 4-which includes the naturalization clause-also es-
tablishes that "Congress shall have Power To ... establish ... uni-
form Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies throughout the United
States.' ' 167 The courts, however, do not completely defer to the polit-
ical branches in the bankruptcy context.
In contrast, the judiciary grants heightened deference for non-
constitutional reasons. For example, courts defer to the political
branches in the war powers arena because of compelling national in-
terests. 68 Courts do not defer to the political branches in this context
because the war powers are specifically enumerated in the Constitu-
159. Id.




164. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4 (bankruptcy clause) and U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1
(taxing clause).
165. See infra notes 167-169 and accompanying text.
166. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1 (providing Congress with the taxing power). See also
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 2 (providing Congress with the power to borrow funds with the
backing of the federal government); U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (providing Congress with the
exclusive power to make copyright and patent laws).
167. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 2.
168. See Gilligan v. Morgan, 413 U.S. 1, 6-8 (1973). Congress' war powers are enumer-
ated in U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cls. 11-16.
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tion, but rather because the power is incidental to sovereignty. 169
Therefore, as in the war powers context, any heightened deference to
the political branches must be incidental to sovereignty.
The historical background of the naturalization clause estab-
lishes that the Framers sought uniformity in naturalization law. 170 In
drafting the naturalization clause, the Framers did not permit the
political branches to circumvent the separation of powers doctrine in
the Constitution. Consequently, any heightened deference to the
political branches in this field must be incidental to sovereignty.
2. Immigration and Naturalization Case Law
Because heightened judicial deference to the political branches in
this area is incidental to the sovereignty of the federal government, it
is essential to look at relevant common law. A significant amount of
immigration-related case law deals with exclusion cases in which
aliens are denied initial entry into the United States. Generally, most
naturalization provisions are closely tied to compliance with immigra-
tion criteria established by Congress and various administrative agen-
cies.17 1 Due to this close relationship, the Court's findings in the
exclusion context are relevant to naturalization matters.
During the United States' first one hundred years, the federal
government did not formally regulate immigration. 172 By the late
nineteenth century, however, Congress passed the first laws excluding
aliens from the United States. 173 These initial laws excluded Chinese
aliens based solely on their race. For example, these laws required
lawfully admitted persons of Chinese ancestry to carry proper docu-
mentation, or obtain the affirmance of a "white" person, in order to
avoid the risk of deportation. 174 Early landmark Supreme Court deci-
sions, such as The Chinese Exclusion Case 175 and Lem Moon Sing v.
169. See id. at 11-12. The suit in Gilligan was brought in the aftermath of the shootings at
Kent State University. The plaintiffs sought a declaratory judgment and injunctive relief
against the governor of Ohio and the leadership of the Ohio National Guard. The Court
refused to make a ruling since it found that the case constituted a nonjusticiable political
question.
170. C. GORDON & S. MAILMAN, supra note 2, § 14.1.
171. Id. § 1.02[1]. The commentators note that it is difficult to draw a "bright line" distin-
guishing immigration and naturalization law as they are traditionally treated as counterparts
of each other.
172. Immigration Policy, supra note 1, at 1290.
173. Id. at 1289.
174. See Kwock Jan Fat v. White, 253 U.S. 454, 455 (1920).
175. 130 U.S. 581 (1889). In this case, the Supreme Court first articulated "the govern-
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United States,17 6 upheld these laws, deferring to the legislative and
executive branches.
Since these early cases, courts have developed distinct themes in
immigration and naturalization jurisprudence to justify deference to
the political branches. 77 These themes include the sovereign power
doctrine and the right-privilege distinction. T8 Each of these themes,
however, lacks continuity with general case law.
a. The Sovereign Power Doctrine
The sovereign power doctrine states that the power to exclude
aliens is "an inherent attribute of sovereignty-a power necessary to
preserve orderly international relations and to protect the country
from foreign encroachments and dangers."'' 79 The Supreme Court
has stated that "over no conceivable subject is the legislative power of
Congress more complete" than over immigration matters. 80 Thus,
the Court holds this power to be largely immune from constitutional
review.' 8 ' However, this immunity does not extend to executive
ment's authority to establish the substantive conditions of entry." See Immigration Policy,
supra note 1, at 1312.
176. 158 U.S. 538 (1895). In Lem Moon Sing, the alien appellant lived and operated a
business in San Francisco. Id. at 539. Prior to congressional passage of the Chinese Exclusion
Act, the appellant departed on a temporary visit to his native China. Id. The government
denied him reentry upon his return to the United States after the Chinese Exclusion Act took
effect. Id. at 540.
The Supreme Court upheld enforcement of the Chinese Exclusion Act against the appel-
lant. Id. at 549-50. Justice Harlan reasoned that the broad language of the statute evidenced
congressional intent to apply the act to all Chinese nationals entering the United States; even
those previously domiciled in the United States. Id. at 547. Moreover, the Supreme Court
refused to question congressional wisdom in this matter. Id. at 549-50.
177. Immigration Policy, supra note 1, at 1314.
178. Id.
179. Id. at 1315. See Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 765 (1972). In Kleindienst, the
Supreme Court upheld the Attorney General's denial of a non-immigrant visa to Mandel, a
self-described "revolutionary Marxist," who wished to publicly speak at several universities in
the United States. The Court cited a line of cases supporting the proposition that aliens have
no constitutional right of entry. Id. at 762. See, e.g., Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522, 530-32
(1954); Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 592 (1952); United States ex rel. Knauff v.
Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 542 (1950); United States ex rel. Turner v. Williams, 194 U.S. 279,
292 (1904).
The Kleindienst Court also rejected the respondent's alternative argument that his poten-
tial audience had a first amendment right to listen to him. The Court reasoned that, although
the right to listen implicated some first amendment concerns, these concerns were outweighed
by the United States' inherent sovereign power. Kleindienst, 408 U.S. at 755-66.
180. Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 792 (1977) (quoting Oceanic Navigation Co. v.
Stramahan, 214 U.S. 320, 339 (1909)).
181. Immigration Policy, supra note 1, at 1315 n. 12.
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branch conduct when it contravenes an express congressional
statute. 182
The sovereign power doctrine is premised on the federal govern-
ment's need to protect the nation from foreign dangers. 18 3 For exam-
ple, in Fiallo v. Bell, 1 84 the Supreme Court analyzed a federal
immigration statute that prohibited preferential immigration status
for illegitimate children of fathers who were United States citizens or
lawful permanent residents." 5 Thus, these children could only apply
for citizenship through standard immigration statutes and regula-
tions. 186 In contrast, the statutory provision in Fiallo did confer pref-
erential status on children born out of wedlock to mothers lawfully
present in the United States.18 7 The natural fathers and their illegiti-
mate children brought suit claiming the statutory scheme deprived
them of their equal protection and due process rights. The Fiallo
Court nevertheless rejected the plaintiffs' challenge of Congress'
power to exclude aliens.8 8 The Court reasoned that since congres-
sional authority in the immigration law context is political in charac-
ter, such power is subject to narrow judicial review.
89
The sovereign power doctrine's failure is that it obscures the
prospect of finding a workable constitutional limitation. 190 In addi-
tion, the doctrine cannot be reconciled with well-grounded cases hold-
ing that the judicial branch plays a constitutional role in immigration
and naturalization law matters where the executive branch fails to
execute the will of Congress. For example, in Kwock Jan Fat v.
White,' 9' the Supreme Court intervened when it found that non-judi-
cial proceedings were "manifestly unfair."' 192. In Kwock, the petitioner
left the United States on a temporary visit to China. 93 He left the
United States only after documenting his status as United States citi-
182. See infra notes 206-209 and accompanying text.
183. See Kleindienst, 408 U.S. at 753. This justification was also put forth in the Congres-
sional Record as a policy basis behind the IRCA. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
184. 430 U.S. 787 (1977).
185. Id. at 788-90.
186. Id. at 791.
187. Id. at 788.
188. Id. at 799-800.
189. The Fiallo Court cited several cases for this proposition. See Hampton v. Mow Sun
Wong, 426 U.S. 88, 101 n.21 (1976); Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 713
(1893).
190. Immigration Policy, supra note 1, at 1318.
191. 253 U.S. 454 (1920).
192. Id. at 457.
193. Id. at 456.
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zen by birth. 194 However, upon the petitioner's return, the Commis-
sioner of Immigration denied the petitioner reentry to the United
States merely because "the claimed American citizenship is not estab-
lished to [the Commissioner's] satisfaction."' 195 The petitioner subse-
quently filed for habeas corpus relief.' 96 The Court found that the
inspector's report contained no material evidence supporting exclu-
sion.' 97 Despite the judiciary's concededly narrow scope of review,
the Court held that the Commissioner's decision was an abuse of dis-
cretion. 98 Thus, the Court reasoned, the investigator exceeded his
statutory authority. 9 9
As the Fiallo Court subsequently affirmed, the sovereign power
doctrine does not completely foreclose all judicial review in the immi-
gration law arena.200 The Supreme Court cited several cases affirming
the sovereign power doctrine.20' However, as this line of cases illus-
trates, the courts only apply this doctrine when individuals directly
challenge a congressional statute or an administrative branch action
that is authorized pursuant to Congress' legislative power. 202
In sum, the Fiallo Court demanded heightened deference to the
"political departments" based on the sovereign power doctrine. 20 3
However, the Court did not give the executive branch heightened def-
erence in the IRCA cases because the executive branch failed to prop-
erly execute Congress' statutorily defined public policy.
This distinct situation, which does not call for the invocation of
the sovereign power doctrine, is illustrated by the fact that the cases
the Fiallo Court cited in support of the doctrine did not involve exec-
utive misconduct contrary to the intent of Congress.2°4 Moreover, in
194. Id. at 455.
195. Id. at 456.
196. Kwock Jan Fat v. White, 253 U.S. 454, 458 (1920).
197. Id.
198. Id. at 464.
199. Id. (citing Low Wah Suey v. Backus, 225 U.S. 460 (1912)).
200. Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 792 (1977). The Court expressly left open a "narrow
[degree ofi judicial review." Id.
201. Id. The Fiallo Court cited several cases in support of the sovereign power doctrine.
See, e.g., Shaughnessy v. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 210 (1953); Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S.
580 (1952); Lem Moon Sing v. United States, 158 U.S. 538 (1895); Fong Yue Ting v. United
States, 149 U.S. 698 (1893); The Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. 581 (1889).
202. Fiallo, 430 U.S. at 792.
203. Id.
204. Id. See, e.g., Shaughnessy v. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 208, 210 (1953) (petitioner ex-
cluded since Congress expressly authorized the President to impose exclusion conditions pur-
suant to Passport Act); Lem Moon Sing v. United States, 158 U.S. 538, 548 (1895) (executive
branch acted under congressional charge to exclude petitioner under the Chinese Exclusion
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Harisiades v. Shaughnessy,205 which the Fiallo Court cited, the
Supreme Court expressly rejected the petitioner's contention that the
INS failed to comply with the "letter, spirit and intention" of one
congressional statute.20 6 Ultimately, the Harisiades Court upheld the
INS's exclusion power 20 7 since the agency duly executed the authoriz-
ing statute, the Alien Registration Act of 1940.208
b. The Right-Privilege Distinction
The Supreme Court also occasionally defers to the political
branches by citing the right-privilege distinction. 20 9 Under this doc-
trine, admission to the United States is aprivilege granted by the legis-
lative branch-on its own terms-rather than a right subject to
constitutional protection. 210 The right-privilege distinction was origi-
nally espoused by Justice Holmes in 1895.211 The dichotomy was
gradually picked up by state and federal courts in a variety of
contexts.2 1
2
The right-privilege distinction has been strongly criticized21 3 as
an inadequate basis for constitutional review because the distinction is
based on circular reasoning. 214 Moreover, the distinction provides no
Act); Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 713 (1893) (petitioners excludable since
immigration law was regulated statute and executed by administrative branch); The Chinese
Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. 581, 589 (1889) (petitioner excluded as challenge to congressional
power to promulgate Chinese Exclusion Act failed).
205. 342 U.S. 580 (1952).
206. Id. at 583-84. Two petitioners challenged the validity of the Administrative Proce-
dure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 1011, which, at that time, authorized their deportation proceedings. Har-
isiades, 342 U.S. at 583 n.4. But the Court rejected this claim since deportation proceedings
against the petitioners were instituted prior to the effective date of this statute. Id.
207. Harisiades, 342 U.S. at 595-96.
208. 8 U.S.C. § 137 (1940).
209. See Immigration Policy, supra note 1, at 1318.
210. Id.
211. See Commonwealth v. Davis, 162 Mass. 510, 39 N.E. 113 (1895).
212. Van Alstyne, The Demise of the Right-Privilege Distinction in Constitutional Law, 81
HARV. L. REV. 1439, 1440 (1968). See, e.g., Barsky v. Board of Regents, 347 U.S. 442 (1954)
(suspension of medical license upheld as physician's "right" to practice medicine was subject
to conditions of the state); Bailey v. Richardson, 182 F.2d 46 (D.C. Cir. 1950) (summary
dismissal of federal civil servant suspected of disloyalty upheld--despite first amendment con-
cerns-because no constitutional guarantee of government employment); Scopes v. State, 289
S.W. 363 (Tenn. 1927) (teacher had no constitutional right to serve the state).
213. See Van Alstyne, supra note 212, at 1440.
214. Id. at 1460. To illustrate the tautology, Van Alstyne substituted Holmes' definition
of a "right" for the word itself, "[blecause the public force will not be brought to bear upon
those who discharged petitioner, he has no right to be a policeman. And because petitioner
has no right to be a policeman, the public force will not be brought to bear upon those who
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substantive explanation of why constitutional review should be extin-
guished in particular circumstances.
215
One commentator noted how the judiciary has gone to great
lengths to emasculate the distinction. 216 For example, courts have de-
veloped the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions. 217 Under this
principle, the government cannot indirectly force people to waive
their constitutional rights as a condition to receipt of government ben-
efits or privileges. 218 Courts have also limited the right-privilege dis-
tinction on procedural due process 219 and equal protection grounds.
220
Despite the criticism, this eroded distinction occasionally sur-
faces in immigration case law, warranting further discussion.22' The
seminal case adopting this justification in the immigration law context
is United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy.222 In Shaughnessy, the
Court upheld the government's absolute power to exclude aliens on
the grounds that such persons have no constitutional right to enter
the United States. 223 The Shaughnessy Court reasoned that since
Congress could freely exclude all aliens, that the privilege of admis-
sion need only be available "upon such terms as the United States
shall prescribe.
'224
Nonetheless, the judiciary's continued use of the right-privilege
distinction in the immigration law arena is incompatible with subse-
quent Supreme Court rulings recognizing that other so-called privi-
leges cannot be unconstitutionally denied based on the right-privilege
distinction.225 In Goldberg v. Kelly,2 2 6 for example, the Court refused
discharged him." Id. (quoting McAuliffe v. Mayor of New Bedford, 155 Mass. 216, 29 N.E.
517 (1892)).
215. Id.
216. Id. at 1445-57.
217. Id. at 1445.
218. Id. at 1446-47. See Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967) (housing code
regulation which provided for warrantless administrative searches struck down).
219. Van Alstyne, supra note 212, at 1451-54. The constitutional right to procedural due
process can operate independently of substantive due process rights. Id. at 1452.
220. Id. at 1454-57. The author noted that, under the equal protection clause, "it seem-
ingly makes no difference that the threatened interest is a privilege rather than a right." Id. at
1454.
221. See Immigration Policy, supra note 1, at 1318-20.
222. 338 U.S. 537 (1950). The Shaughnessy Court upheld the Attorney General's decision
to deny a public hearing and to exclude the petitioner-a foreign national married to a United
States citizen-on the ground that such a hearing would be prejudicial to the United States.
223. Id. at 543.
224. Id. at 542.
225. Immigration Policy, supra note 1, at 1318.
226. 397 U.S. 254, 262 (1970).
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to withhold minimal due process protection for a welfare benefit re-
cipient based on the meaningless label that such benefits are "a privi-
lege and not a right."227 The Supreme Court's ruling in Goldberg,
invalidating the right-privilege distinction, should apply with equal
force to modem immigration and naturalization matters.
B. The "Affirmative Misconduct" Exception and the Survival of
Equitable Relief
1. Several Cases Affirm the "Affirmative Misconduct" Exception
The sovereign power doctrine and the right-privilege distinction
illustrate the judiciary's heightened deference to the political branches
in the immigration and naturalization law context. However, the
courts reject the proposition that the judiciary has no constitutional
role in this area. As illustrated above, the Supreme Court established
long ago that aliens could seek relief in federal courts where the exec-
utive branch abused its discretion and failed to properly execute con-
gressional policy. 228 Moreover, several recent decisions illustrate that
the federal courts continue to play an active role in immigration and
naturalization law matters. These decisions have upheld estoppel
claims and equitable relief in immigration and naturalization law mat-
ters when the actions of executive branch officials have amounted to
"affirmative misconduct."
One case where the judiciary granted relief under estoppel princi-
ples was Corniel-Rodriguez v. INS.229 In Corniel-Rodriguez, an immi-
grant sought a visa that would grant her entry into the United States
as an unmarried child of a parent who had already obtained perma-
nent resident status.230 A United States Consul, in violation of State
Department regulations, failed to warn the immigrant that her visa
would be invalidated if she married prior to her arrival in the United
States.231 Unaware of this restriction, the immigrant married three
days before departing for the United States and she was denied entry
by the INS. 232 The court of appeals reversed the INS decision and
held that the Consul's noncompliance with regulations constituted af-
firmative misconduct. 233 Accordingly, the court exercised its equity
227. Id. See also Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 627 n.6 (1969).
228. See supra notes 190-208 and accompanying text.
229. 532 F.2d 301 (2d Cir. 1976).
230. Id. at 303.
231. Id. at 304.
232. Id.
233. Id. at 306-07.
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powers and prohibited the INS from deporting the immigrant. 234
Another example of a federal court granting equitable relief is In
re La Voie.235 In that case, La Voie, a French national who was mar-
ried to a United States citizen, filed a petition under a federal law
permitting naturalization after three years of continuous residence.
236
La Voie then inquired whether her leaving the United States would
jeopardize her continuous resident status. 237 The INS assured La
Voie that her absence from the country would not affect her naturali-
zation proceedings.238 However, upon her return, the INS denied La
Voie citizenship because her absence from the United States violated
the continuous residency requirement. 239 As a result, La Voie sued to
compel the INS to naturalize her.240 The judge found that the peti-
tioner's good-faith reliance on the government's faulty advice pre-
vented her from bringing her naturalization petition within the letter
of the law.241 As a result, the La Voie court, while recognizing the
general reluctance to grant estoppel claims against the government,
held that La Voie was entitled to naturalization.
242
V. INS V. PANGILINAN: A POTENTIAL STUMBLING BLOCK FOR
EQUITABLE RELIEF UNDER THE IRCA
As the previous cases indicate, courts may enjoin the INS's pro-
spective use of an improper regulation.243 However, in light of the
Supreme Court's recent ruling in INS v. Pangilinan,244 the INS has
argued that courts lack the equitable authority to provide retrospec-
tive relief to undocumented aliens who are precluded or deterred from
seeking temporary resident status under the IRCA due to the INS's
234. Corniel-Rodriguez v. INS, 532 F.2d 301, 307 (2d Cir. 1976).
235. 349 F. Supp. 68 (D.V.I. 1972).




240. In re La Voie, 349 F. Supp. 68, 70 (D.V.I. 1972).
241. Id. The judge ruled that the petitioner did not seek to take personal advantage of
government inaction.
242. Id. at 74.
243. 65 INTERPRETER RELEASES 958 (Sept. 19, 1988). This point is well settled. In
Ayuda, the INS implemented new regulations pursuant to Judge Sporkin's order. Id. In Cath-
olic Social Services, the INS did not challenge the court's invalidation of the "brief, casual, and
innocent" provision. Id. at 1010 (Oct. 3, 1988).
244. 108 S. Ct. 2210 (1988).
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erroneous execution of the statute. 245
The Pangilinan case concerned the 1942 Act,246 which author-
ized the INS Commissioner to designate representatives to "receive
petitions, conduct hearings, and grant naturalization outside the
United States" for foreign veterans serving in the United States armed
forces.247 Furthermore, the 1942 Act directed the INS Commis-
sioner, with the approval of the Attorney General, to implement regu-
lations to carry out the 1942 Act's provisions. 248  The 1942 Act
specified that these special naturalization arrangements would expire
on December 31, 1946.249
In three separate cases, sixteen Filipino nationals, who served in
the United States Armed Forces during World War II, petitioned for
naturalization under the 1942 Act in various federal district courts.
250
The petitions were opposed by the INS and denied by the district
courts because the petitions were filed after the 1942 Act's deadline
expired. 25' On appeal, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals consoli-
dated two of these cases and ruled that fifteen of these Filipino veter-
ans were entitled to United States citizenship as an equitable remedy,
due to the Attorney General's wrongful administration of the 1942
245. See 65 INTERPRETER RELEASES 769 (Aug. 1, 1988). See also 65 INTERPRETER RE-
LEASES 1010 (Oct. 3, 1988).
246. See supra notes 7-9 and accompanying text.
247. See Pangilinan, 108 S. Ct. at 2213. The Court referred to section 702 of the 1942 Act,
which provided:
During the present war, any person entitled to naturalization under section [701] of
this [Act], who while serving honorably in the military... forces of the United States
is not within the jurisdiction of any court authorized to naturalize aliens, may be
naturalized in accordance with all the applicable provisions of section 701 without
appearing before a naturalization court. The petition for naturalization of any peti-
tioner under this section shall be made and sworn to before, and filed with, a repre-
sentative of the Immigration and Naturalization Service designated by the
Commissioner or a Deputy Commissioner, which designated representative is hereby
authorized to receive such petition in behalf of the Service, to conduct hearings
thereon, to take testimony concerning any matter touching or in any way affecting
the admissibility of any such petitioner for naturalization, to call witnesses, to admin-
ister oaths, including the oath of the petitioner and his witnesses to the petition for
naturalization and the oath of renunciation and allegiance prescribed by section 335
of the Act, and to grant naturalization, and to issue certificates of citizenship ....
Id. at n.3.
248. Id. at 2213. Section 705 of the 1942 Act provided that "[tihe Commissioner, with the
approval of the Attorney General, shall prescribe and furnish such forms, and shall make such
rules and regulations, as may be necessary to carry into effect the provisions of the Act." Id. at
n.4.
249. Second War Powers Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1001 (1942).
250. INS v. Pangilinan, 108 S. Ct. 2210, 2212 (1988).
251. Id. at 2214-15.
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Act.252 The Supreme Court heard the appeal on all these cases.25 3 In
reversing the court of appeals, the Court rejected the Ninth Circuit's
assertion that a court's equitable powers could allow the judiciary to
confer citizenship in the absence of an express statutory provision.254
A. Relevant Facts and Procedural History
1. History of the 1942 Act
In 1942, Congress amended the Nationality Act of 1940.255 Be-
tween 1943 and 1945, the INS dispatched its officials to overseas mili-
tary posts to naturalize eligible aliens in the United States military.256
However, the conditions in the Philippines presented a unique situa-
tion. 257 The Japanese occupation of the Philippines during this period
precluded all United States naturalization efforts there. Nevertheless,
during this three year span, approximately 7,000 Filipino soldiers
were naturalized as United States citizens by either: (1) the federal
courts in the United States; or (2) the INS officials stationed abroad
but outside of the Philippines.258 The INS officials were appointed
pursuant to Section 702 of the 1942 Act.259 In August 1945, after the
United States Army liberated the Philippines, the Attorney General
appointed George Ennis, the United States Vice Consul in Manila, to
naturalize eligible Filipinos seeking United States citizenship pursuant
to the 1942 Act. 26
°
Political considerations soon affected the executive branch's en-
forcement of the 1942 Act. Philippine government officials expressed
concern that their fledgling nation, scheduled for independence on
July 4, 1946,261 would suffer a serious manpower drain if the 1942 Act
252. Pangilinan v. INS, 796 F.2d 1091, 1097 (9th Cir. 1986), rev'd, 108 S. Ct. 2210 (1988).
253. Pangilinan, 108 S. Ct. at 2212.
254. Id. at 2217. In dicta, the Court also stated that any due process rights the Filipino
veterans possessed were not violated by the actions of the administrative branch. Id. at 2216.
Furthermore, the Court held that the government's conduct did not violate the equal protec-
tion component of the fifth amendment's Due Process Clause. Id. at 2217.
255. Pub. L. No. 76-853, 54 Stat. 1137 (1940). The Nationality Act of 1940 contained
general naturalization provisions which preceded the modern statutory scheme of naturaliza-
tion law.





261. See Philippine Independence Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-127, § 10(a), 48 Stat. 456,
463 (1934).
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were fully implemented.262 "Apparently concerned that the naturali-
zation program would adversely affect United States relations with
the new Philippine government, the INS Commissioner requested the
Attorney General to revoke all naturalization authority of the INS
representative in the Philippines. ' 263 Consequently, on October 26,
1945, the Attorney General revoked Ennis' naturalization authority.
The INS and the Attorney General apparently believed that Congress
authorized, but did not require, the INS to use its naturalization pow-
ers under the 1942 Act.
264
Between October 1945 and August 1946, the INS refused to nat-
uralize Filipino war veterans in the Philippines. 265 Although INS offi-
cials implemented the 1942 Act elsewhere in the world, the INS
purposely did not station a person with naturalization authority in the
Philippines for that nine month period. 266 Moreover, Filipinos who
were discharged from the armed forces during this period were not
allowed to apply for naturalization when the program was reinstated
because the 1942 Act only covered individuals presently serving in the
armed forces.267 The INS recognized that the revocation of Ennis'
authority would deprive many veterans of their legal rights to seek
naturalization under the 1942 Act.
268
After a new section 702 official269 was designated in August
1946, the INS naturalized approximately 4,000 more Filipinos prior
to the 1942 Act's expiration on December 31, 1946.270 The revoca-
tion of naturalization authority "during those nine months of 1945
and 1946 has led to a stream of litigation involving efforts by Filipino
veterans to obtain naturalization under the expired [1942] Act. ' 271
262. INS v. Pangilinan, 108 S. Ct. 2210, 2214 (1988).
263. Comment, Naturalization of Filipino War Veterans, 22 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1171,
1173 (1985).
264. In re 68 Filipino War Veterans, 406 F. Supp. 931, 936 (N.D. Cal. 1975).
265. Pangilinan, 108 S. Ct. at 2214.
266. Id.
267. Comment, supra note 263, at 1173.
268. See In re 68 Filipino Veterans, 406 F. Supp. 931 (N.D. Cal. 1975). An internal INS
memorandum from Edward J. Shaughnessy, Special Assistant to the commissioner of the INS
to Ugo Carusi, the INS Commissioner, maintained that the revocation of the vice consul's
naturalization authority left "the rather anomalous situation that while we recognize in law
the legal right of these persons to the benefits under the Act we have, from an administrative
standpoint, made it impossible for such persons to acquire these benefits." Id. at 936 n.6.
269. INS v. Pangilinan, 108 S. Ct. 2210, 2214 (1988). These officials were authorized to
naturalize foreign nationals serving in the United States Army who applied for citizenship
under the Act.
270. Pangilinan, 108 S. Ct. at 2213.
271. Id. In fact, the United States government estimates that between 60,000 to 80,000
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2. Plaintiffs' Backgrounds
Pangilinan arose from three separate lawsuits brought against
the INS. The first group ("Pangilinan respondents") included four-
teen individuals who were eligible for naturalization under the 1942
Act.272 They sued the INS in the United States District Court for the
Northern District of California, 273 alleging that they were eligible for
naturalization although they had not taken affirmative steps toward
naturalization prior to the expiration of the 1942 Act. 274 The district
court, following Olegario v. United States,275 a Second Circuit case
with similar facts, denied the Pangilinan respondents' naturalization
requests, stating that the Attorney General's revocation of an immi-
gration authority in the Philippines for a nine month period was a
proper exercise of his discretion.
276
Another respondent, Mario Valderrama Litonjua, served in the
United States Navy from May 1941 through April 1946.277 Although
Litonjua had made no effort to apply for naturalization while on ac-
tive duty, he did attempt to obtain citizenship as a civilian employee
of the United States Army.278 However, Litonjua failed to complete
the proper paperwork prior to the December 31, 1946 expiration
date.279 The district court rejected Litonjua's claim "for reasons simi-
lar to those adopted by the district court in Pangilinan.
' '28 0
eligible Filipino war veterans were affected by the INS' administration of the 1942 Act. See
Comment, supra note 263, at 1173.
272. Pangilinan, 108 S. Ct. at 2214.
273. Id.
274. INS v. Pangilinan, 108 S. Ct. 2210, 2214 (1988).
275. Olegario v. United States, 629 F.2d 204 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 980
(1981). In Olegario, the petitioner served in the Philippine Army from December 20, 1942
through December 2, 1945, which made him eligible for naturalization under the 1942 Act up
until his December discharge. However, as in Pangilinan, no INS official was empowered to
naturalize Filipino soldiers after Ennis' authority was revoked on October 26, 1945. Olegario
made no effort to apply for naturalization while Ennis was duly empowered to naturalize ac-
tive Filipino soldiers. Id. at 211.
Olegario asserted that the Attorney General's action violated his constitutional rights and
precluded him from seeking naturalization. The Second Circuit determined that the 1942 Act
did not confer citizenship upon the petitioner, but merely an opportunity to apply for United
States citizenship. Id. at 223-24. The Second Circuit concluded that the Attorney General
properly exercised the executive's inherent limited discretion under the 1942 Act in light of
foreign policy concerns regarding the lost manpower to the soon-to-be independent Philippine
republic. Id. at 228.
276. Pangilinan, 108 S. Ct. at 2212.
277. Id. at 2214.
278. Id.
279. INS v. Pangilinan, 108 S. Ct. 2210, 2214 (1988).
280. Id.
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Bonifacio Lorenzana Manzano was the final respondent. 281
Manzano claimed that, after completing his military service in July
1946, he specifically inquired at the United States Embassy in the
Philippines about obtaining United States citizenship. 282 However,
Manzano was told that nobody at the embassy could properly assist
him. 283 Manzano filed suit in the Southern District of California.284
The court denied Manzano citizenship for reasons similar to those
cited by the district courts that heard the naturalization claims of
Litonjua and the Pangilinan respondents.285
The Ninth Circuit consolidated the appeals of the Pangilinan re-
spondents and Litonjua. 286 In direct conflict with the Second Circuit
(Olegario), the Ninth Circuit reversed the district courts' holdings
287
and ruled that the revocation of Ennis' authority violated the
mandatory character of the language of sections 702 and 705 of the
1942 Act.288 As a result, the court exercised its "broad remedial pow-
ers" and naturalized the respondents. 28 9 After the Ninth Circuit de-
nied INS petitions for rehearing, the United States Supreme Court
granted certiorari290 and consolidated Manzano's case for review with
the Ninth Circuit's decision.
291
B. The Reasoning of the Pangilinan Court
Concluding that the veterans lacked a statutory basis for natural-
ization, 292 the Court's primary basis for reversing the Ninth Circuit's




284. INS v. Pangilinan, 108 S. Ct. 2210, 2214 (1988).
285. Id. at 2214-15.
286. Id. at 2215.
287. Pangilinan v. INS, 796 F.2d 1091, 1103 (9th Cir. 1986), rev'd, 108 S. Ct. 2210 (1988).
288. Id. at 1099.
289. INS v. Pangilinan, 108 S. Ct. 2210, 2215 (1988).
290. Pangilinan v. INS, 796 F.2d 1091 (9th Cir. 1986), cert. granted, 484 U.S. 814 (1987).
291. Id. The Court allotted a maximum of one hour-the typical allowance-for oral
arguments on these consolidated claims.
292. Pangilinan, 108 S. Ct. at 2215-16. This particular issue was not presented to the
Court; nevertheless, Justice Scalia pointed out that the respondents had no statutory right to
naturalization. Id. at 2215. Justice Scalia concluded that section 701 of the 1942 Act pre-
cluded naturalization of anyone failing to complete all filing procedures prior to December 3 1,
1946. Id. Justice Scalia also reasoned that Congress did not intend to extend the deadline
since Congress did not include provisions for Filipino servicemen in 1948 legislation, the Na-
tionality Act of 1952, or subsequent amendments to the Nationality Act of 1952. Id. at 2216.
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gard a congressionally-mandated filing deadline.293 Justice Scalia,
writing for the Supreme Court, pointed out that article I, section 8,
clause 4 of the Constitution expressly vests Congress with all naturali-
zation powers. 294 Justice Scalia added that Congress failed to ex-
pressly provide the judicial branch with equitable powers in
naturalization matters.295 He went on to cite language from the de-
naturalization proceedings of a Nazi war criminal which stated:
"[o]nce it has been determined that a person does not qualify for citi-
zenship, . . . the district court has no discretion to ignore the defect
and grant citizenship. ' 296 While admitting that private litigants may
seek equitable remedies against the government in other contexts, Jus-
tice Scalia wrote that normal rules of equity and estoppel do not apply
when a government agency, such as the INS, enforces "a public policy
established by Congress.
'297
In support of its reasoning, the Pangilinan Court compared the
case before it with INS v. Hibi.298 In that case, Hibi, a Filipino, en-
listed in the United States Army and served with a military unit
known as the Philippine Scouts. 299 The Japanese Army captured and
imprisoned Hibi during its occupation of the Philippines. 30 ° With the
retaking of the Philippine Islands by Allied Forces, Hibi was released
and rejoined the Scouts. 30  Hibi continued to serve with the Scouts
until December 1945.302 Approximately twenty years later, while in
the United States on a visitor-for-business visa, Hibi petitioned the
293. Id. at 2215.
294. INS v. Pangilinan, 108 S. Ct. 2210, 2215 (1988).
295. Id. at 2216.
296. Id. (quoting Fedorenko v. United States, 449 U.S. 490, 517 (1981)). In Fedorenko,
the petitioner served as an armed guard at various Nazi concentration and labor camps.
Aware that his wartime activities rendered him ineligible to emigrate to the United States
under the Displaced Persons Act ("DPA"), he falsified his visa and naturalization applica-
tions. Fedorenko, 449 U.S. at 496.
The United States government brought a denaturalization action charging the petitioner
with willfully concealing material information in applying for his DPA visa and, subsequently,
for citizenship. The Fedorenko Court stated that all statutory prerequisites to citizenship must
be complied with in order to obtain naturalization. Id. at 506. Since the petitioner falsified
facts that would have led to the denial of his visa application, the Court affirmed the peti-
tioner's denaturalization. Id. at 515.
297. Pangilinan, 108 S. Ct. at 2215.
298. 414 U.S. 5 (1973).
299. Id. at 5-6.
300. Id. at 5.
301. Id.
302. Id. at 6.
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INS for naturalization under the provisions of the 1942 Act.30 3
Hibi argued that, during the eligibility period, the INS failed to:
(1) advise him that he was eligible for naturalization under the 1942
Act; and (2) provide a naturalization official in the Philippines.
3°4
The Hibi Court rejected Hibi's argument that the INS should be es-
topped from denying him citizenship because it failed to properly ad-
vise him of his rights.30 5 Furthermore, the Court rejected his estoppel
argument based on the government's failure to continuously provide a
naturalization representative in the Philippines after World War II
ended. 30 6 The Court referred to the general rule that, in cases of es-
toppel, the sovereign is not similarly situated to private litigants when
attempting to enforce congressional mandates.
30 7
The Hibi Court further held that, as a general rule, the govern-
ment may not be estopped in immigration matters. 308 However, the
Court recognized that Montana v. Kennedy309 held open the prospect
of an "affirmative misconduct" exception to the general rule. 310 In
Hibi, the Court found that the government's failure to assign a natu-
ralization official in the Philippines on a continuous basis did not con-
stitute affirmative misconduct. 311 Thus, the Hibi Court held that the
official acts, which happened to be the same as those complained of in
Pangilinan, could not give "rise to an estoppel that prevented the
Government from invoking the December 31, 1946, cutoff in the
[1942] Act. ' 312 Unfortunately, the Hibi Court failed to define what
actions constitute affirmative misconduct, leaving the lower federal
courts to speculate as to the proper standard.
The Pangilinan controversy involved the same alleged executive
misconduct as Hibi. However, the sixteen veterans in Pangilinan
tried to distinguish their claim by raising a subtly distinct remedial
theory. While the Hibi Court rejected an estoppel argument which
sought to render the December 1946 cutoff invalid, 31 3 in Pangilinan,
the petitioners' claims rested on the judiciary's authority to grant eq-
303. INS v. Hibi, 414 U.S. 5, 7 (1973).
304. Id. at 6-7.
305. Id. at 7.
306. Id. at 8.
307. Id.
308. INS v. Hibi, 414 U.S. 5, 8 (1973).
309. 366 U.S. 308, 314-15 (1961).
310. Hibi, 414 U.S. at 8.
311. Id. at 8-9.
312. INS v. Pangilinan, 108 S. Ct. 2210, 2215 (1988).
313. INS v. Hibi, 414 U.S. 5, 8-9 (1973).
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uitable relief despite the validity of the December 1946 naturalization
deadline. 3' 4 Justice Scalia rejected this distinction because the Court's
reasoning in both cases "clearly produces the same result. ' 31 5 There-
fore, the Pangilinan Court ruled that the judiciary lacked the equita-
ble power to confer citizenship on individuals who failed to timely file
their naturalization applications under the 1942 Act.31 6
In Pangilinan, the Court appeared to devise a blanket rule that
courts may never use their equity powers to grant citizenship by ex-
tending a statutory petition deadline. 31 7 In establishing this rule, the
majority completely ignored the "affirmative misconduct" exception
previously recognized in Hibi. As a result, lower courts may improp-
erly infer that Pangilinan advocates a far narrower judicial role in
immigration and naturalization matters than previously mandated by
the Hibi Court.
C. Pangilinan Does Not Foreclose Equitable Relief
1. Pangilinan Is Distinct from Cases Involving "Affirmative
Misconduct" by the Executive Branch
Those who attempt to apply INS v. Pangilinan to the context of
the temporary residence provisions of the IRCA must consider more
than a single ruling; rather, they should take a broad view of immigra-
tion and naturalization jurisprudence. The Supreme Court's ruling in
Pangilinan does not foreclose judicial review by denying courts the
ability to forge equitable remedies in any case that happens to pertain
to immigration or naturalization law. Rather, the Supreme Court
merely followed the sovereign power doctrine in the immigration law
context and held that the judicial branch must allow the INS to carry
out statutorily defined public policy.
In Pangilinan, the Supreme Court reiterated that Congress had
the "exclusive constitutional power" to provide for naturalization re-
quirements.318 The veterans in Pangilinan conceded that they were
not entitled to naturalization under the 1942 Act or any other stat-
ute. 3 19 However, based on considerations of fairness, the veterans ar-
314. Pangilinan, 108 S. Ct. at 2215.
315. Id.
316. Id. at 2216.
317. INS v. Pangilinan, 108 S. Ct. 2210, 2215 (1988).
318. Id. In full, the Court stated, "Congress has again exercised its exclusive constitu-
tional power to provide that any petition for naturalization filed on or after September 26,
1961, will be heard and determined under the 1952 Nationality Act." Id.
319. Id.
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gued that the Court should exercise its equitable authority and order
the INS to naturalize them.320 The Court rejected this argument and
restated the settled doctrine that the judiciary lacks the power to fash-
ion equitable remedies which run counter to Congress' express in-
tent. 321 Hibi had already demonstrated that the INS's failure to warn
the veterans, or make naturalization officials available in the Philip-
pines, did not constitute "affirmative misconduct. ' 322 Thus, the
Pangilinan Court did not perceive a need to address a similar factual
situation in which the INS failed to carry out Congress' express public
policy.
In Fiallo v. Bell, the Supreme Court refused to overturn a dis-
criminatory immigration statute.323 The petitioners only challenged
the statute's constitutional validity, they did not contend that the ex-
ecutive branch failed to properly administer the statute in question.
3 24
Thus, based on the sovereign power doctrine, the Fiallo Court found
that the plaintiffs' claims were similar to prior immigration cases sub-
ject to heightened judicial deference. 325
In Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, as in Pangilinan, the Supreme
Court rejected the immigrants' assertion that the INS failed to com-
ply with the immigration statute that the INS was executing.
326
Therefore, the Court refused to substitute its judgment for a legisla-
tive mandate.327 Indeed, Pangilinan flows from a settled line of cases,
based upon the sovereign power doctrine, which refuse to question
legislative judgment or the executive branch's permissible execution of
that judgment.
320. Id.
321. Id. at 2216.
322. INS v. Hibi, 414 U.S. 5, 8 (1973).
323. Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 789-91 (1977). Three sets of unwed natural fathers and
their children argued that 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(14) discriminated against them by only allowing
illegitimate natural mothers to seek preferential immigration status for their offspring abroad.
Id.
324. Id. at 791. The petitioners' original complaint challenged the constitutionality of the
statute. Id. They argued that the statute denied them equal protection, due process and their
right of privacy. Id.
325. Id. at 793.
326. Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 583-84 (1952).
327. Id. at 580. The Harisiades Court expressly rejected the petitioners' contentions that
certain hearing procedures did not comply with the Administrative Procedure Act.
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2. The Sovereign Power Doctrine Does Not Apply When an
Administrative Agency Fails To Properly Execute
Statutory Public Policy
The judiciary only applies heightened deference under the sover-
eign power doctrine when the executive branch properly executes a
congressional statute. In Kwock Jan Fat v. White, the Supreme Court
established that the judiciary may overturn administrative proceed-
ings in which the executive officers abuse their statutorily authorized
discretion. 32 8 In Kwock, unlike Pangilinan, the Court found that the
applicable statute did not authorize the executive official's conduct.
32 9
As a result, the Kwock Court did not apply heightened deference to
the executive officer's unauthorized actions pursuant to the sovereign
power doctrine.
In INS v. Hibi, the Supreme Court validated the "affirmative
misconduct" exception to the sovereign power doctrine. 330 Moreover,
various federal court cases have granted equitable relief when lower
level INS officials have affirmatively failed to execute a statute pursu-
ant to the intent of Congress. For instance, in Corniel-Rodriguez v.
INS, the court, pursuant to its equitable power, enjoined the INS
from deporting an alien. 331 In that case, a low-level INS official vio-
lated regulations that were adopted pursuant to the applicable stat-
ute.332 Further, in In re La Voie, a low-level INS official gave the
immigrant faulty advice which directly prevented her from complying
with a congressional statute. 333 As an equitable remedy, the La Voie
court ordered the INS to naturalize the petitioner. 33
4
In Corniel-Rodriguez and La Voie, both courts found affirmative
misconduct by the INS officials and held that the INS failed to foster
the statutory policies they were empowered to uphold. In contrast, in
Pangilinan and Hibi, the Supreme Court found no such "affirmative
misconduct" by INS officials and the Attorney General in failing to:
(1) advise veterans that they were eligible for naturalization under the
1942 Act; and (2) provide naturalization officials in the Philippines.
335
328. Kwock Jan Fat v. White, 253 U.S. 454, 458 (1920).
329. Id. at 464.
330. INS v. Hibi, 414 U.S. 5, 8 (1973).
331. Comiel-Rodriguez v. INS, 532 F.2d 301, 307 (2d Cir. 1976).
332. Id. at 306-07.
333. In re La Voie, 349 F. Supp. 68, 69 (D.V.I. 1972).
334. Id. at 74.
335. See Hibi, 414 U.S. at 6-7. In Pangilinan, the Court did not expressly discuss this
factual question. However, the Pangilinan Court noted the virtual similarity between the two
1990]
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The lack of affirmative misconduct found in Pangilinan and Hibi dis-
tinguishes these cases from Corniel-Rodriguez and La Voie. As a re-
sult, the sovereign power doctrine, which applied to the former cases,
should not apply to the latter.
VI. PANGILINAN Does Not Hinder the Judiciary's Ability to Forge
Equitable Remedies In Cases Involving "Affirmative
Misconduct"
Although the Supreme Court denied equitable relief in
Pangilinan, that result does not apply in cases of "affirmative miscon-
duct," such as Ayuda, Inc. v. INS and Catholic Social Services, Inc. v.
INS. As noted above, Ayuda and Catholic Social Services involved
executive branch actions that were inconsistent with the purposes be-
hind the IRCA. In each of the cases, the courts have found that the
INS affirmatively acted in an improper manner.336 Moreover, the
INS yielded to each courts' criticism of the service's misconduct.337
A. Ayuda and Catholic Social Services Are Consistent with Case
Law Granting Equitable Relief from the Affirmative
Misconduct of INS Officials
The recent litigation involving the INS's wrongful administration
of the IRCA favorably compares to case law which has upheld the
judiciary's power to forge equitable remedies in cases of affirmative
misconduct. In Corniel-Rodriguez and La Voie, low-level INS offi-
cials committed affirmative acts that deprived aliens of their statutory
rights. In Corniel-Rodriguez, the INS official failed to follow INS reg-
ulations-passed pursuant to congressional mandate-that required
the official to notify the alien of certain visa restrictions. 338 In La
Voie, the INS official wrongly assured the petitioner that certain con-
duct would not violate her statutory residence requirement. 339 In
both of these cases, the courts found affirmative misconduct that justi-
fied the courts' exercise of equitable authority. 34
°
cases when it stated that the use of a subtly distinct equitable theory "clearly produces the
same result." INS v. Pangilinan, 108 S. Ct. 2210, 2215 (1988).
336. See 65 INTERPRETER RELEASES 590 (June 6, 1988). See also 65 INTERPRETER RE-
LEASES 1010 (Oct. 3, 1988).
337. Id. In both cases, the INS did not appeal the district courts' injunction of the
proceedings.
338. See supra notes 229-234 and accompanying text.
339. See supra notes 235-242 and accompanying text.
340. See supra notes 229-242 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 12:643
Equitable Remedies Under IRCA
In Ayuda and Catholic Social Services, high-level executive offi-
cials promulgated regulations which construed the IRCA in an un-
duly narrow manner. 34  Thousands of undocumented aliens
suffered as a result of the INS's faulty interpretation of the IRCA.
342
Although the IRCA litigation is arguably distinct because it in-
volves administrative discretion by high-level INS officials, this argu-
ment is unpersuasive. First, courts only defer to reasonable
administrative interpretations of statutes. 343 The judiciary only in-
validates regulations when the challenging parties can prove that the
regulations are either: (1) contrary to the plain language of the under-
lying statute; or (2) the regulation leads to a result that is inconsistent
with the congressional purpose.344 There is no basis for the judiciary
to defer to high-level administrative officials who abuse their discre-
tion in promulgating such regulations. Second, if this distinction is
the basis for greater deference, then top executive branch officials
could never be estopped for flagrant noncompliance with congres-
sional mandates that they are sworn to uphold.
Conversely, the recent IRCA litigation is not comparable to
Pangilinan. The Pangilinan Court found no affirmative misconduct
by the executive branch in carrying out the 1942 Act.345 In adminis-
tering the IRCA, the INS has occasionally failed to properly imple-
ment certain key statutory provisions. 346  In erroneously
implementing certain IRCA provisions, the INS deterred many un-
documented aliens from applying for temporary resident status under
the IRCA.347 Such action involves "affirmative misconduct" which
allows courts to forge equitable remedies to correct the injustice and
carry out congressional mandates. In these instances, the INS loses
341. See supra notes 96-116 & 136-149 and accompanying text.
342. See 65 INTERPRETER RELEASES 375 (Apr. 11, 1988) (plaintiffs' attorneys estimated
that up to 50,000 aliens could benefit from Judge Sporkin's order in Ayuda). See also 65
INTERPRETER RELEASES 611 (June 13, 1988) (25,000 aliens estimated as members of the
plaintiff class in Catholic Social Services v. Meese).
343. See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837,
842-43 (1984).
344. Id. at 843. Courts shall not substitute their judgment for that of the administrative
agency. If the statute is silent or ambiguous on the specific issue, courts defer to the adminis-
trative interpretation. Id.
345. See supra notes 308-316 and accompanying text.
346. Judge Sporkin applauded the INS's handling of the legalization program. Despite his
ruling in Ayuda, Judge Sporkin commended the INS for taking steps to carry out Congress'
mandate in the IRCA. Ayuda, Inc. v. Meese, 687 F. Supp. 650, 666 n.20 (D.D.C. 1988), rev'd
sub nom. Ayuda, Inc. v. Thornburgh, 880 F.2d 1325 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
347. See supra notes 117 & 150 and accompanying text.
1990]
Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L.J.
the shelter of the sovereign power doctrine and cannot argue that the
courts are precluded from granting equitable remedies.
B. Ayuda and Catholic Social Services Are Distinguishable from
Cases Upholding the Sovereign Power Doctrine
Traditional Supreme Court cases never expressly refer to an "af-
firmative misconduct" exception. Rather, these cases focused on the
scope of the sovereign power doctrine. In prior challenges to adminis-
trative regulations, the sovereign power doctrine largely precluded ju-
dicial review in cases where the executive official or agency properly
carried out a congressional mandate. 348 In contrast, other cases over-
turned unauthorized executive actions by reasoning that such acts
were not protected by the sovereign power doctrine.
349
Ayuda and Catholic Social Services are factually distinct from
these older cases which applied the sovereign power doctrine. The
IRCA litigation involves INS regulations which frustrated Congress'
policy of focusing government resources on controlling illegal immi-
gration rather than attempting to ferret out undocumented aliens who
have settled in, and contributed to, the United States. 350 By seeking
to expel aliens based on unnecessarily rigid demands, the INS acted
improperly and contrary to congressional intent.351 Therefore, the
improper actions taken by the INS in Ayuda and Catholic Social Serv-
ices are precisely the kind of affirmative misconduct supporting invo-
cation of equitable remedial power rather than the sovereign power
doctrine.
VII. CONCLUSION
In sum, interpreting the Supreme Court's recent opinion in INS
v. Pangilinan as absolutely precluding the judiciary from forging equi-
table remedies is inaccurate. In Ayuda and Catholic Social Services,
among other cases, 35 2 the INS affirmatively frustrated congressional
348. In Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580 (1952), the Supreme Court upheld the
INS's power to exclude aliens pursuant to its proper execution of the Alien Registration Act, 8
U.S.C. § 137 (1940). In Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787 (1976), the Court upheld congressional
power to exclude aliens since Congress possesses the inherent sovereign power to control
immigration.
349. See Kwock Jan Fat v. White, 253 U.S. 454, 455 (1920).
350. See supra notes 33-38 and accompanying text.
351. Ayuda, Inc. v. Meese, 687 F. Supp. 650, 663 (D.D.C. 1988), rev'd sub nom. Ayuda,
Inc. v. Thornburgh, 880 F.2d 1325 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
352. Courts have held that the INS has improperly construed other IRCA provisions. In
Zambrano v. INS, Civ. S-88 No. 455 EJG (E.D. Cal. Aug. 9, 1988), Judge Edward Garcia
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policy through its unduly narrow construction of the IRCA. 353  In
contrast, in expressly following Hibi, the Supreme Court reasserted
that the INS's failure to continuously station a naturalization official
in the Philippines, or notify veterans of their rights under the 1942
Act, did not constitute affirmative misconduct. 354 Consequently, the
fact that equitable relief was denied in Pangilinan does not mean that
equitable relief is never available in the IRCA litigation involving af-
firmative misconduct by INS officials. 355
The INS's assertion that Pangilinan should be extended to apply
in the context of the IRCA lacks any sound legal basis. As previously
noted, the sovereign power doctrine only requires the judiciary to ap-
ply heightened deference to executive branch decisions when execu-
tive officials are fulfilling congressional mandates. 356 However, in
Ayuda and Catholic Social Services, the INS regulations affirmatively
frustrated Congress' purposes in passing the IRCA.3
57
Moreover, the right-privilege distinction adds little to the INS's
argument that it is entitled to unfettered discretion. This conclusory
distinction has been continuously criticized by the bench and bar.
358
Although this distinction has occasionally been cited, in the immigra-
tion context, in some older cases, 359 its continued use in light of more
recent Supreme Court rulings which expressly reject this rationale in
connection with other privileges is suspect.
360
In light of the case law in this field, it is doubtful that the
Supreme Court intended to foreclose all equitable remedies in immi-
gration and naturalization matters. Such a ruling would reverse "200
years of Anglo-American jurisprudence governing the equitable pow-
enjoined the INS regulation in 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(d)(4), which set forth an unduly narrow
definition of a "public charge" under 8 U.S.C. § 1255a(d)(2)(B)(iii). 65 INTERPRETER RE-
LEASES 818 (Aug. 15, 1988). In League of United Latin American Citizens v. INS, Civ. 97
No. 4757 WDK (C.D. Cal. Aug. 12, 1988), Judge William Keller enjoined the INS legalization
policy under 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(b)(8) which, contrary to congressional policy underlying the
IRCA, distinguished between reentries documented on Form 1-94 and those not so docu-
mented. 65 INTERPRETER RELEASES 818 (Aug. 15, 1988).
353. See supra notes 96-116 & 136-149 and accompanying text.
354. See supra notes 299-317 and accompanying text.
355. INS v. Pangilinan, 108 S. Ct. 2210, 2216 (1988).
356. See supra notes 180-208 and accompanying text.
357. See supra notes 96-116 & 136-149 and accompanying text.
358. See supra notes 209-227 and accompanying text.
359. See supra notes 211-212 and accompanying text.
360. See supra notes 213-227 and accompanying text.
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ers of courts to redress injuries for which there is no adequate remedy
at law. '361
Jon G. Miller*
361. 65 INTERPRETER RELEASES 819 (Aug. 15, 1988) (quoting Catholic Social Services,
Inc. v. Meese, No. S-86 Civ. 1343 LKK (E.D. Cal. Aug. 11, 1988), enforcing 685 F. Supp.
1149 (1988)).
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